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Managing Multi-District Litigations:
Problems and a Proposal
Charles Silver
Geoffrey P. Miller 63 Vand. L. Rev. 107 (2010)
This Article uses three recent multi-district litigations
("MDLs") that produced massive settlements-Guidant ($240
million), Vioxx ($4.85 billion), and Zyprexa ($700 million)-to study
the emerging quasi-class action approach to MDL management.
This approach has four components: (1) judicial selection of lead
attorneys, (2) judicial control of lead attorneys' compensation, (3)
forced fee transfers from non-lead lawyers to cover lead attorneys'
fees, and (4) judicial reduction of non-lead lawyers' fees to save
claimants money. These procedures have serious downsides. They
make lawyers financially dependent on judges and, therefore, loyal
to judges rather than clients. They compromise judges' independence
by involving them heavily on the plaintiffs' side and making them
responsible for plaintiffs' success. They allocate moneys in ways that
likely overcompensate some attorneys and undercompensate others,
with predictable impacts on service levels. The procedures used in
Guidant, Vioxx, and Zyprexa also lack needed grounding in
substantive law because the common fund doctrine, which supports
fee awards in class actions, does not apply in MDLs. Academics
have not previously noted these shortcomings; this is the first
scholarly assessment of the quasi-class action approach.
This Article proposes an alternative method of MDL
management. It recommends implementation of a default rule that
would vest control of an MDL in a plaintiffs' management committee
("PMC") composed of the attorney or attorney-group with the most
valuable client inventory, as determined objectively by the trial
judge. The PMC, which would have a large interest in the success of
an MDL, would then select and retain other lawyers to perform
common benefit work ("CBW") for all claimants. The PMC would
also monitor the other lawyers' performance. The new approach
would thus use micro-incentives, rather than judicial control and
oversight, as the means for organizing the production of CBW in
MDLs.
This proposal would be a default rule that would govern in
the absence of an alternative agreement by or among the PMC and
other lawyers with cases in an MDL. In other words, lawyers would
be free to create a governance structure for an MDL knowing that the
default rule would apply if they were unable to come to terms. This
would permit lawyers to design governance structures superior to
that created by the default rule. The court would stand back from
the process, exercising only a limited backup authority to prevent
abuses. The proposal would restore judicial independence; preserve
lawyers' loyalties; provide the requisite legal foundation for fee
awards; and encourage fairer, more efficient, and more appropriate
representation of claimants in MDLs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The preferred way of handling mass tort lawsuits in the federal
courts has long been for the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation
("JPML") to transfer and consolidate the cases in a single federal
district court.1 Federal judges have handled over one thousand multi-
district litigations ("MDLs"), the biggest of which have involved tens of
thousands of plaintiffs with billions of dollars in liability claims. 2
1. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 185-86 (2001) [hereinafter
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster]; Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort
Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 895 (2001) [hereinafter
Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting].
2. The Diet Drugs MDL encompassed over 18,000 personal injury lawsuits, as well as a
class action with 6 million members. In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2002). The
settlement required the defendant to pay over $6 billion, of which more than $600 million was
awarded to MDL counsel and class counsel combined. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F. Supp. 2d 442, 456-59 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
[hereinafter In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.]. The Vioxx MDL encompassed approximately
50,000 claimants. The settlement cost $4.85 billion. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Will the Vioxx
Settlement Work?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com /2007/11/12/merck-vioxx-
lawsuits-biz-health-cz_df1112vioxx.html; Morning Edition: Merck Reaches $4.8 Billion
Settlement in Vioxx Case (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=16147998. The lead attorneys in the MDL
and related state court actions have requested 8 percent of the settlement fund, $388 million, in
108 [Vol. 63:1:107
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Given this wealth of experience, one would expect MDL procedures to
be highly developed, carefully considered, and transparent. In some
respects, they are.3 But procedures that are central to the operation of
MDLs on the plaintiffs' side are rudimentary and opaque. These
procedures also raise serious policy concerns that have not previously
been identified or addressed. Consider four examples.
Appointment of Lead Attorneys. Judges appoint the lawyers
who run MDLs on the plaintiffs' side. Their choices can be puzzling.
For example, judges sometimes give lead positions to lawyers with few
or no clients in an MDL, passing over other lawyers whose clients
number in the hundreds or thousands. Judges also wield the
appointment power with unfettered discretion. They need not explain
why they choose some lawyers rather than others, and rarely do. They
face no known risk of appellate review or reversal: no appointment
decision seems ever to have been challenged, much less reversed.
Compensation of Lead Attorneys. Over the long history of
MDLs, judges have awarded lead attorneys billions of dollars in fees
and cost reimbursements. Typically, fee awards range from 4 percent
to 6 percent of total recoveries, but smaller and larger percentages can
be found.4 This practice supposedly rests on the common fund
doctrine, a creature of the law of restitution which undergirds fee
awards in class actions. Yet the Supreme Court has never said the
doctrine applies in MDLs, which are consolidations rather than class
suits, and the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the
Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment suggests otherwise: "By
comparison with class actions, court-imposed fees to appointed counsel
in consolidated litigation frequently appear inconsistent with
restitution principles."5
Neutralized Opposition. Because MDL judges select lead
attorneys and control their compensation, lead attorneys rarely
challenge them. In practical effect, MDL judges are lead lawyers'
common benefit fees. The Settlement Channel, The Vioxx Settlement. What Does It Mean and
What Happens Next?, http://thesettlementchannel.squarespace.com/the-settlement-channel-
blog/2007/11 /10/the-vioxx-settlement-what-does-it-mean.and-what-happens-next.html (Nov. 10,
2007, 09:11 EST).
3. For example, MDL judges now plan openly and successfully for inter-court cooperation,
which makes pre-trial discovery proceed more smoothly. See Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle
Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV.
LITIG. 47, 49-50 (2007).
4. See William B. Rubenstein, On What A "Common Benefit Fee" Is, Is Not, and Should Be,
3 CLASS ACTION ATT'Y FEE DIG. 87, 88-90 (Mar. 2009) (reporting fee award percentages for
twenty-one MDLs).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUsT ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt.
b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
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clients.6 Fee-related concerns also cause non-lead lawyers to fear MDL
judges, who take from them the money lead lawyers receive. By
challenging an MDL judge, a non-lead lawyer must be willing to risk
retribution in the form of a heavy fee tax. Because judges leave the
size of forced fee transfers open until litigation ends, obedience is the
prudent course for non-lead lawyers until an MDL formally
concludes-or even longer when non-lead lawyers have cases in other
MDLs being handled by the same judge.
Ungrounded Regulation. MDL judges not only tax non-lead
lawyers; they also cut non-lead lawyers' fees. For example, an MDL
judge might order a non-lead lawyer with a 40 percent contingent fee
contract to give 8 percent to the lead attorneys and to rebate another 8
percent to the client. The lawyer would end up with a 24 percent fee,
meaning that the contractual fee was cut almost by half. Although
judges justify forced rebates by arguing that MDLs reduce non-lead
lawyers' costs, they make no serious effort to connect the amount
rebated to the amount saved. A rigorous econometric analysis of scale
economies in MDLs would require an expert armed with data and a
model. Judges never consult such experts. They invent numbers
instead.
Obviously, these fee reductions give lawyers involved in MDLs
another reason to be deferential. The price of impertinence may be an
exceptionally large fee cut. Less apparent is the impact fee cuts have
on non-lead lawyers' incentives. By rendering contingent fees
unpredictable, judges discourage non-lead lawyers from providing
services that would help clients. A downward spiral is predictable: fee
cuts discourage lawyers from working hard, leading judges to demand
larger rebates because they see lawyers slacking off. The spiral will
primarily benefit defendants, who will face fewer claims and enjoy
cheaper settlements when plaintiffs' lawyers find litigation less
profitable.
The four practices just described-judicial appointment of lead
attorneys, judicial control of lead attorneys' compensation, forced fee
transfers, and fee cuts-jointly constitute the emerging "quasi-class
action" approach to MDL management. Picking up on an idea first
advanced by the Fifth Circuit in the mid-1970s, several judges have
recently ruled that MDLs are "quasi-class actions."7 The label is apt,
6. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2129 (2000) ("Judges now have the power of payment, serving more like clients and consumers. .
7. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2009 WL 2408884, at *3 (E.D.
La. Aug. 3, 2009); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 2511791, at *1
110 [Vol. 63:1:107
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they contend, because a judge presiding over an MDL enjoys the same
broad equitable powers as a judge presiding over a class action,
including the power to implement the four practices just described.
Writing in 2000, Professor Judith Resnik observed that judges were
"reluctant to delve too deeply" into fee-related matters in mass tort
cases.8 In the past decade, they overcame that reluctance. Judges now
regulate mass tort MDLs extensively and assert particularly
expansive power over fees.
Although the judges' intentions are exemplary-they are trying
to fashion tools with which to resolve complicated, multi-party cases in
reasonable time and at reasonable cost-the quasi-class action
approach has serious downsides. By managing MDLs as they have,
judges have compromised their independence, created unnecessary
conflicts of interest, intimidated attorneys, turned a blind eye to
ethically dubious behavior, and weakened plaintiffs' lawyers'
incentives to serve clients well.
This Article is the first to examine systematically the rules and
norms that govern the appointment, powers, compensation, and
monitoring of lead attorneys in MDLs. 9 After analyzing and critiquing
existing practices, it proposes a new MDL management approach. The
proposal would establish a default rule requiring an MDL judge to
appoint a Plaintiffs' Management Committee ("PMC") made up of
lawyers with valuable client inventories: often, but not necessarily,
lawyers with the largest numbers of signed clients. The PMC would
then select, set compensation terms for, and monitor a group of
(E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008). The roots of the quasi-class action doctrine extend back to In re Air
Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades. 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977) (observing that "the
number and cumulative size of the massed cases created a penumbra of class-type interest on the
part of all the litigants and of public interest on the part of the court and the world at large.")
[hereinafter Everglades Crash]. Judge Weinstein appears to have first enunciated the idea in
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 480-81 (1994) ("What is clear
from the huge consolidations required in mass torts is that they have many of the characteristics
of class actions . . . . It is my conclusion . . . that mass consolidations are in effect quasi-class
actions. Obligations to claimants, defendants, and the public remain much the same whether the
cases are gathered together by bankruptcy proceedings, class actions, or national or local
consolidations.").
8. Resnik, supra note 6, at 2121-22. Even at the start of the decade, however, "judges
ha[d] begun to reserve some of the money (formerly conceived to 'belong' to individual attorneys)
to pay common benefit lawyers." Id. at 2175.
9. Many scholarly writings address MDLs as an important species of litigation and discuss
examples of their use. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT
(2007); Hensler, Revisiting the Monster, supra note 1; Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting,
supra note 1; Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel's Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245
(2008); Resnik, supra note 6. However, no prior writing discusses the pros and cons of the quasi-
class action approach to MDL management or the specific procedures identified in the text.
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common benefit attorneys ("CBAs") who would perform the common
benefit work ("CBW") MDLs require. CBW is legal work beneficial to
all plaintiffs, such as discovery relating to factual issues common to all
plaintiffs' claims.10 PMC members would receive only fees from their
signed clients, but this should motivate them to select, incentivize,
and monitor CBAs with care because good CBW will make their client
inventories more valuable. CBAs would draw fees on a pro rata basis
from all lawyers with cases in an MDL. Having the largest client
inventories, PMC members would pay the most. This would motivate
them to obtain the best combination of quality and price from the
available CBAs. Attorneys not on the PMC would benefit
automatically from the PMC members' efforts to help themselves.
This approach would act as a default rule, which judges would
follow in the absence of an agreement among the PMC and other
lawyers on a different governance structure. Allowing consensual
agreements to displace the default rule ameliorates the problem of
forcing all consolidations into a single mold. It also gives attorneys the
option of using governance structures with duties that are well-
established under the law governing partnerships, corporations, or
other joint ventures to address known problems, such as the
possibility that lawyers in charge of an MDL will exploit attorneys in
lesser positions.
The presiding judge's involvement in the management of the
plaintiffs' side of an MDL would ordinarily end with the appointment
of the PMC. The judge would be available to adjudicate any claims of
mismanagement or wrongful behavior and, as now, to ensure that
non-lead lawyers receive appropriate opportunities to develop unusual
or unique aspects of their clients' cases. Because the judge would have
limited control over the choice of PMC members and would otherwise
be removed from compensation issues on the plaintiffs' side, both the
lawyers' and the judges' independence would be restored. Our proposal
would also promote objectivity and transparency, harmonize the
interests of lead attorneys and plaintiffs, reduce disputes over lawyers'
fees, and improve monitoring of CBW. Lastly, it would foster good
incentives by fixing lead attorneys' compensation in advance.
MDL judges could adopt most elements of our proposal directly.
They already appoint lead attorneys. The proposal simply gives them
criteria to apply when doing so and requires them to make appealable
findings of fact. In these respects, the proposal resembles the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), which requires a




trial judge handling a securities class action to appoint as lead
plaintiff the party with the largest financial stake in the litigation.
This proposal has more potential than the PSLRA to improve the
conduct of litigation, however. Only some investors put in charge of
securities fraud class actions have the expertise, knowledge of the
case, and financial interests needed to manage large lawsuits
effectively. Under our proposal, all PMC members will have these
attributes, for all will be successful lawyers with valuable client
inventories.
This Article is structured as follows: Part II describes the MDL
management practices used in three recent cases-Guidant, Vioxx,
and Zyprexa-all of which endorse the "quasi-class action" doctrine.
Part III characterizes the economic problem these control rules
address-the optimal production of CBW-and critiques the manner
in which the practices are applied. Part IV sets out our proposal and
defends it against various objections. Part V concludes.
II. THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION MODEL OF MDL MANAGEMENT
The cases we discuss in this Article involve large numbers of
lawsuits-sometimes tens of thousands-which are consolidated for
pre-trial litigation purposes in a single federal court." These MDLs
resemble class actions in one obvious respect: many plaintiffs claim to
have suffered harm from a common action or course of conduct, such
as the manufacture and sale of a pharmaceutical. But the MDLs we
discuss are not class actions: they are not brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23; they are not certified under the Rule 23
standards of commonality, typicality, numerosity, adequacy of
representation, predominance, and superiority; there is no
representative plaintiff; and there is no attorney appointed by the
court as counsel for the entire class. The MDLs simply aggregate
individual lawsuits in a single court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for
the sake of convenience and efficiency.
Like many other MDLs involving defective product claims, the
MDLs we discuss are not class actions for good reason. They are mass
tort cases in which differences in exposure, background health
conditions, knowledge, and other factors preclude class certification
11. A federal MDL typically includes all related cases filed in federal courts, but fails to
catch cases that were filed in state courts from which they could not be removed. When
significant state court litigation exists, inter-court coordination may occur. See Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, In Rem, Quasi In Rem, and Virtual In Rem Jurisdiction Over Discovery, 10 SEDONA
CONF. J. 253, 261 (2009) ("[Flederal courts have increasingly recognized the great advantages of
active federal/state court coordination, particularly in multi-jurisdictional mass torts.").
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under the standards set forth in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor1 2
and Ortiz v. Fibreboard,13 cases in which the Supreme Court rejected
attempts to resolve complex claims for personal injury due to asbestos
exposure by means of a class action structure. 14 In some of these
MDLs, the presiding judge denied a motion for class certification,
establishing clearly that a class action could not proceed. 15
Even so, the judges presiding over these MDLs referred to the
proceedings as "quasi-class actions." The attraction of the label is
understandable. Judges have considerable power to manage class
actions as they wish, and judges overseeing MDLs want the same
powers. But the label is also dangerous. Class action procedures may
not be necessary or appropriate in MDLs.
A. MDL Basics and Three Selected Aggregations
In 1968, Congress authorized the JPML to transfer related
cases pending in diverse federal courts to a single forum for pre-trial
processing. The object was to "promote the just and efficient conduct of
[the] actions"16 by taking advantage of scale economies and creating
opportunities for global settlements. 7 The JPML has been active ever
since.' 8 As of 2009, it "ha[d] considered motions for centralization in
over 2,000 dockets involving . .. millions of claims .... These dockets
encompass[ed] litigation categories as diverse as airplane crashes;
other single accidents, such as train wrecks or hotel fires; mass torts,
such as those involving asbestos, drugs and other products liability
12. 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
13. 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999).
14. The Federal Judicial Center found that the rate at which mass tort cases were certified
as class actions for trial declined after Amchem and Ortiz, while the frequency of certification for
purposes of settlement increased. THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATTORNEY
REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIz ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REGARDING A
CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS 4 (2004), available at http://www.fc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup
/amort02.pdf/$file/amort02.pdf.
15. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 461-63 (E.D. La. 2006).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2007).
17. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.132 (2004) ("One of the values of
multidistrict proceedings is that they .... afford a unique opportunity for the negotiation of a
global settlement."); Resnik, supra note 6, at 2149 (observing that "the MDL impulse to
aggregate" reflects concerns "about waste and inefficiency").
18. Not everyone is happy about this. For a thoughtful discussion of many problems
associated with expanded use of JPML's power to consolidate lawsuits, see Marcus, supra note 9.
114 [Vol. 63:1:107
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cases; patent validity and infringement; antitrust price fixing;
securities fraud; and employment practices."19
The largest MDLs encompass thousands of cases filed by
legions of attorneys. 20 Unfortunately, precise statistics are not
available. Neither the JPML, the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, nor any other organization collects much data on MDLs. 21 We
therefore constructed a picture of contemporary MDL management in
the product liability area by studying three major MDLs. 22 We
selected In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Products
Liability Litigation ("Guidant"), In re Vioxx Products Liability
Litigation ("Vioxx"), and In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation
("Zyprexa") for several reasons. First, all are products liability cases,
the most common type of MDL.23 The management of these cases
should therefore reflect the wisdom of the federal judiciary
accumulated over many MDLs and many years. Second, these MDLs
arose recently and around the same time. About a year-and-a-half
separates the earliest JPML transfer date (April 4, 2004--Zyprexa)
19. United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, An Overview of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/GeneralInfo/
Overview/overview.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
20. Lawyers with large inventories of signed clients often work in teams or groups.
21. JPML gathers some data and produces cursory reports, which are available at United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Statistical Information,
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/GeneralInfolStatistics/statistics.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
JPML also produces specialized reports for a fee. Neither the reports themselves nor an index of
them is publicly available. E-mail from Ariana Estariel to Charles Silver (July 10, 2008, 02:51:00
CST) (on file with author). The JPML is also so short of staff that it cannot even produce a list of
its data fields for an independent researcher to examine. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, New
York University Law and Econ. Working Paper 6 n.18 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers,
Paper No. 174, 2009), available at http://1sr.nellco.org/nyu_1ewp/174/.
22. Fees have been managed in similar or identical ways in other cases. See, e.g., In re
Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M.05-CV-01699-CRB, 2006 WL
471782, at *2-11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006).
23. The JPML currently divides cases into the following categories: air disaster, antitrust,
contract, common disaster, employment practices, intellectual property, miscellaneous, products
liability, sales practices, and securities. It has used other categories in the past. The categories
do not necessarily track doctrinal lines. See Mark Merrmann & Pearson Bownas, Making Book
on the MDL Panel: Will It Centralize Your Products Liability Cases?, 8 CLAss ACTION LITIG. REP.
110, 111 n.4 (2007). Williams et al. report that "Only 20 percent of all MDL proceedings involve
products liability claims, but the overwhelming majority of cases that are considered and
transferred by the Panel involve such claims." Margaret S. Williams, Richard A. Nagareda, Joe
S. Cecil, Tom Willging, Kevin M. Scott & Emery G, Lee, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict
Consolidation in Federal Civil Litigation: An Empirical Investigation 13 (Aug. 3, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443375). More than 90 percent
of cases in MDLs involve products liability claims. Id.
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from the latest (November 7, 2005-Guidant).24 The cases thus
collectively provide a detailed snapshot of contemporary MDL
management techniques. Third, all three cases are pure
consolidations, meaning that none was handled as a class action. This
simplifies the study of the MDL control rules because we need not
account for complications that arise when (as sometimes happens)
both aggregation procedures are employed concurrently. 25 Fourth, the
judges who handled these cases, Judges Donovan Frank (Guidant),
Eldon Fallon (Vioxx), and Jack Weinstein (Zyprexa), are the principal
authors of the emerging doctrine defining MDLs as "quasi-class
actions." The cases therefore present an opportunity to assess a
developing doctrinal innovation. Fifth, all three judges employed the
control rules of greatest interest to us. Each judge appointed lead26
and liaison 27 attorneys, set these lawyers' compensation, and heavily
regulated the fees all lawyers could charge. Finally, all three cases
produced enormous settlements. Vioxx was the largest, at $4.85
billion; Zyprexa came in second at $700 million; and Guidant trailed
the field at $195 million. These are large sums, even by the standards
of group litigation.
Although the three MDLs are quite similar, they differ in some
interesting respects. First, the judges handling them have different
amounts of experience with MDLs. Judge Weinstein is a seasoned
veteran, with eight terminated MDLs under his belt and two active
MDLs on his docket. 28 Judges Frank and Fallon, on the other hand,
24. The Vioxx litigation was transferred on February 16, 2005. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL Docket No. 1657, 2007 WL 3354137, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007).
25. For a case exemplifying these complications, see In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,
supra note 2. For discussions of the differences between aggregate procedures, see, for example,
Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1773-
84 (2005); Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495
(1991).
26. Lead Counsel handles "substantive and procedural issues during the litigation.
Typically they act for the group-either personally or by coordinating the efforts of others-in
presenting written and oral arguments and suggestions to the court, working with opposing
counsel in developing and implementing a litigation plan, initiating and organizing discovery
requests and responses, conducting the principal examination of deponents, employing experts,
arranging for support services, and seeing that schedules are met." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221; see also id. § 10.224 (discussing the court's role in managing and
overseeing counsel); id. § 22.62 (regarding the organization and designation of counsel by the
court).
27. Liaison Counsel, usually a local attorney, handles "administrative matters, such as
communications between the court and other counsel . . . , convening meetings of counsel,
advising parties of developments, and . . . managing document depositories and . . . resolving
scheduling conflicts." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221.
28. In the world of complex litigation, Judge Weinstein is a living legend and a continuing
source of inspiration to many, including us. Many of his cases have become the focus of scholarly
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are relative newcomers. Neither has completed a single MDL,
although both have handled complex lawsuits of other types. The
proceedings thus present an opportunity to see how closely less
seasoned judges hew to the path blazed by their senior colleague. As
readers will see, although there is a strong tendency to follow the
leader, there also are important points at which Judges Frank and
Fallon have struck out on their own.
Second, Zyprexa, the earliest of the three MDLs, involved
claimants who were psychologically handicapped. The claimants used
Zyprexa because they had schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. One
might therefore reasonably believe the Zyprexa claimants had a
special need for protection, including perhaps protection from the
lawyers they retained. Feelings of paternalism certainly and strongly
colored Judge Weinstein's conduct of the case. No similar basis for
concern existed in Guidant or Vioxx, as no mental illness or like
deficiency afflicted the claimants in these MDLs. The Guidant and
Vioxx claimants suffered serious injuries, including heart attacks and
strokes; they were, however, typical plaintiffs. Many tort cases involve
plaintiffs with devastating injuries, yet these plaintiffs are deemed
responsible adults and are treated as such.2 9 We know of no physical
basis on which to distinguish the Guidant and Vioxx claimants from
other plaintiffs with serious injuries.
Third, although all three MDLs encompassed large numbers of
claimants, the volume of litigation varied greatly. About 4,000
lawsuits alleging injuries from defective defibrillators were pending
when Guidant settled.30 The Zyprexa settlement resolved about 8,000
cases, approximately 75 percent of the litigation faced by Eli Lilly, the
manufacturer. 31 By comparison, the withdrawal of Vioxx from the
market triggered an avalanche of lawsuits. "As of December 2007,
there were approximately 26,600 Vioxx cases involving 47,000
individual 'plaintiff groups' .... Approximately 25,800 claimants were
in the federal MDL and 15,850 in proceedings in the New Jersey
articles and books. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS
IN THE COURTS (1987).
29. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors and Compensation Payments in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2026 (2006) (studying random
sample of medical malpractice cases and finding that 80 percent involved injuries that caused
significant or major disability or death).
30. Gordon Gibb, Guidant Settles 4,000 Claims, Avoids Trial - For Now,
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM, July 30, 2007, available at http://www.lawyersandsettlements.
com/articles/01194/guidant-settles.html.
31. Alex Berenson, Lilly to Pay $690 Million in Drug Suits, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at




Superior Court; an additional 14,100 claimants had entered into
Tolling Agreements with Merck. This indicates a total of 60,100
potential claims in the settlement as of December 2007."32
In theory, differences in size could affect judges' behavior.
Judges may give plaintiffs' attorneys a freer hand in smaller MDLs,
which involve fewer lawyers. Judges may also reduce non-lead
lawyers' fees less in smaller MDLs because these proceedings generate
fewer economies of scale. Whether these differences or others
influenced the judges remains to be seen.
B. Selection and Empowerment of Managerial Attorneys
The need to centralize control arose in all three MDLs.
However, instead of asking the claimants' attorneys to create a unified
governance structure, all three judges did so themselves. 33 Each
appointed a small number of lead and liaison attorneys to an
executive committee and a larger number of attorneys to a Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee ("PSC").3 4 As the cases progressed, each judge
also created additional committees for specific purposes, such as
conducting settlement negotiations or coordinating with attorneys
handling state court cases. Most often, the members of these
specialized committees were also lead or liaison attorneys or PSC
members. Sometimes, however, the judges appointed lawyers who
previously held no formal responsibilities. This was true of the Vioxx
Fee Allocation Committee and the Vioxx Negotiating Committee, both
of which encompassed attorneys with state court cases who had not
previously been involved in the MDL.
The judges selected lead attorneys from pools of volunteers.
They did not explain their choices, even though, as discussed below,
some of their selections were puzzling. The judges were free to pick
the lawyers they wanted because the standards governing
appointments of attorneys to managerial positions are extremely weak
and the risk of reversal is essentially nil. There appears to be no
reported case in which a disappointed lawyer appealed an unfavorable
appointment decision from an MDL judge, let alone one in which an
32. Kritzer Aff. 1 62, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2009)
(citing Joint Report No. 30 of Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Liaison Counsel 8 (Dec. 12, 2007)).
33. The Manual for Complex Litigation encourages judges to impose governance structures.
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 10.22, 10.224, 22.62.
34. In In re Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein created two PSCs as a result of settlements that
required restructuring the plaintiffs' control structure. See Zyprexa MDL Judge Gives A Bit More
In Fees, But Denies Multipliers, Disbursement, 13-12 MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES 7




appointment order by an MDL judge was reversed.35 The Manual for
Complex Litigation advises MDL judges to consider lawyers'
qualifications, competence, interests, resources, and commitment, but
these criteria are so vague that, as a practical matter, judges appoint
the lawyers they want for reasons known only to them. 36
In theory, the dearth of challenges to judicial appointments
could indicate that lawyers are satisfied with judges' selections. In
fact, anyone with experience in MDLs knows this is not so. Lawyers
relegated to non-lead positions often chafe mightily. They refrain from
appealing partly because they do not wish to alienate MDL trial
judges, who have considerable power to make life unpleasant for
them. 37 Also, as a practical matter, the option of appealing is closed.
The legal standards are vague, the facts concerning lawyers' abilities
are inherently subjective, and judges usually appoint well-qualified
lawyers to lead positions. Consequently, a lawyer denied a lead
position would likely find an abuse of discretion impossible to prove.
Once chosen, lead attorneys receive plenary control over MDLs.
For example, the order Judge Frank entered in In re Guidant Corp.
empowered the lead attorneys to:
Determine . . . and present (in briefs, oral argument, or such other fashion as may be
appropriate, personally or by a designee) ... the position of the Plaintiffs on all matters
arising during pretrial proceedings ... ; ... [c]oordinate the initiation and conduct of
discovery on behalf of Plaintiffs ... ; ... [clonduct settlement negotiations on behalf of
Plaintiffs ... ; ... [d]elegate specific tasks to other counsel in a manner to ensure that
pretrial preparation for the Plaintiffs is conducted effectively, efficiently, and
economically; . . . [e]nter into stipulations, with opposing counsel, necessary for the
conduct of the litigation; . . . [p]repare and distribute to the parties periodic status
reports; ... [mionitor the activities of co-counsel to ensure that schedules are met and
unnecessary expenditures of time and funds are avoided; ... [p]erform such other duties
as may be incidental to proper coordination of Plaintiffs' pretrial activities or authorized
by further Order of the Court; and . .. [s]ubmit, if appropriate, additional committees
and counsel for designation by the Court.
3 8
By putting particular attorneys in charge of these matters, Judge
Frank relegated other attorneys to more passive roles. He also created
relationships of dependency. A group of disabled attorneys had to rely
on a coterie of litigation managers to develop their clients' cases. The
disabled lawyers' clients also lost control. They were at the mercy of
lawyers they never hired and could not discharge.
35. This is based on a Westlaw search.
36. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.224.
37. See infra note 118 (discussing the penalties Judge Fallon imposed on lawyers who
challenged his handling of fees in the Vioxx MDL).
38. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2005 WL 3704679, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2005).
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The Manual for Complex Litigation recognizes the vulnerable
position of disabled lawyerS39 and their clients. To protect them, it
subjects lead attorneys to a fiduciary duty, requiring them to "act
fairly, efficiently, and economically in the interests of all parties and
parties' counsel."40 The injunction would be unnecessary if the
interests of managerial lawyers, non-lead lawyers, and claimants were
always the same. But their interests may conflict, and often do. As
shown below, lead lawyers frequently encounter opportunities to
enrich themselves at others' expense. The fiduciary duty requires
them to "act . .. in the interests of all parties and parties' counsel" in
these situations.41
C. The Common Fund Doctrine as Applied to MDLs
Given that MDL judges can appoint managerial attorneys, it
may seem a foregone conclusion that they can compensate managerial
attorneys too. Judges certainly think so: they often comment that the
power to appoint would be "illusory" without the power to
remunerate. 42
The source of an MDL judge's power to remunerate is not
obvious, however.43 The MDL statute says nothing about fees. 44 The
federal class action rule provides no authority either. It permits a
39. We use the labels "non-lead lawyer," "limited lawyer," and "disabled lawyer"
interchangeably.
40. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.22.
41. Id.
42. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2008 WL 682174, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (memorandum opinion and amended order
regarding attorney's fees) (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1005,
1016 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2002 WL 32154197, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2002) ("As a
corollary to this appointment, the court must be permitted to compensate fairly the attorneys
who serve on such a committee.").
43. An interesting question, beyond the scope of this article, is whether federal or state law
regulates fee awards in MDLs containing cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship. Because fee awards affect substantive rights, Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1975), one might contend, per Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and subsequent cases, that state law applies. However,
this could pose serious administrative difficulties in MDLs, which often draw cases from many
states. One might therefore contend that this is an appropriate context in which to develop a
federal common law of procedure. MDL judges seem to have reached this conclusion, though
without arguing for it explicitly.
44. One could argue that the statute empowers judges to create a federal common law of
fees. Cf. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957)
(inferring federal courts' power to fashion federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements). Thus far, no federal court has made this argument.
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federal judge to grant fee awards "that are authorized by law."45 The
question at hand, which Rule 23 does not answer, is whether any
"law" authorizes fee awards to lead attorneys in MDLs.
Judges contend that the common fund doctrine authorizes fee
awards to lead lawyers in MDLs. 46 Fee awards in class actions rest on
this doctrine.47 But MDLs are not class actions, and on close
inspection one sees that, for many reasons, the attempt to invoke the
common fund doctrine in MDLs must fail.
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
agrees. It observes that the "predominant rationale [for fee awards in
consolidations] is not unjust enrichment but administrative
convenience." 48 This comment goes to the heart of the matter. The
common fund doctrine applies only when claimants are unjustly
enriched. To be unjustly enriched, however, more is required than that
claimants benefit from the efforts of others-much more. People often
receive spillover benefits produced by others-called positive
externalities-which the law of restitution allows them to enjoy free of
charge. The few contexts in which restitution is required meet a host
of other requirements. When one examines these requirements, it is
clear that the common fund doctrine does not apply to MDLs.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
46. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (setting
fee caps at 35 percent of client's recovery for attorneys involved in the MDL, subject to individual
increase or decrease at discretion of Special Masters); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574
F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 (E.D. La. 2008) (awarding 32 percent of common fund to attorneys involved
in the Vioxx MDL); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 WL
682174, at *19 (capping fee awards for attorneys in this MDL at 20 percent, subject to individual
increase by petition to the Special Masters). Some commentators agree. See, e.g., Mary Katherine
Bedard, Attorney Fee Awards and the Common Fund Doctrine: Hands in the Plaintiffs' Pockets?,
PLAINTIFF MAG. 1, 2 (2008) ("It is without question that a court has the power to award fees from
a common fund to designated counsel who performed tasks on behalf of the group."); Mark G.
Boyko, The Role of Judges and Special Masters in Post-Settlement Claims Administration, 11
MEALEY's EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES 33 (2006) ("While MDL plaintiffs are represented by
counsel of their choosing, and likely have contingency fee agreements with them, those retail
attorneys and their clients benefit collectively from the work of those on the plaintiffs steering
committee, and, therefore, owe at least some portion of their settlement share to the leading
plaintiffs counsel who oversaw uniform discovery, argued motions and otherwise protected the
interest of all cases in the MDL."); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass
Torts: Access, Risk, and the Provision of Legal Services when Layers of Lawyers Work for
Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 430 ("At the conclusion of such
litigations, when attorney fee payments come into play, the equitable common fund doctrine
enables judges to supervise the payment of fees and costs to attorneys.").
47. For a detailed examination of the restitutionary basis for fee awards in class actions, see
Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
656 (1990-1991); see also Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 245-46 (describing origins and
justification for the common fund doctrine).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2004).
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1. The Enrichment Requirement
One condition for restitution is that after receiving benefits
produced by others, claimants must be better off than they would have
been on their own. This requirement is easily met in class actions that
yield payments, for without the class action many, most, or all class
members would have recovered nothing. As the Supreme Court
observed in Amchem:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
attorney's) labor.
4 9
Class actions typically aggregate claims worth little or nothing in
conventional lawsuits.
MDLs have a different, and even contrary, core purpose. Every
claimant caught up in an MDL has a claim large enough to warrant a
conventional lawsuit. In fact, every claimant has already sued. Every
claimant also has an attorney who is aggressively pushing his or her
case toward resolution in a favorable court. If the primary purpose of
the class action is to remedy a litigation drought, the purpose of an
MDL is to deal with a litigation flood. When a torrent of lawsuits
threatens to overwhelm the courts, judges protect their limited
resources by diverting the flow into an MDL. After all, the MDL's core
purpose is "administrative convenience," as the Restatement rightly
observes.50 But the predictable effect of such "convenience" is to make
plaintiffs worse off by denying them the advantages of decentralized
litigation under the control of their own attorneys.
"Commentators generally agree that MDL practice favors the
defense," as Judge William G. Young observed in DeLaventura v.
Columbia Acorn Trust.51 This is partly because "MDL practice is slow,
very slow." 52 Plaintiffs usually favor early trials. Defendants prefer to
put off the day of reckoning. By forcing plaintiffs to incur substantial
delays, MDLs reduce the value of their claims.
49. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. b.
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004); see also Silver, supra note 47, at 664-65 (setting out conditions for
the application of the common fund doctrine in class actions); Silver, supra note 25, at 497-500
(explaining differences between class actions and consolidations that make it difficult to apply
the common fund doctrine in the latter).
51. 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (D. Mass. 2006).
52. Id. at 150.
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A bigger problem is that MDL judges cannot try cases
transferred to them. They can only prepare these cases for trial.53 This
limitation on MDL courts declaws plaintiffs in transferred cases by
depriving them of the weapon that pressures a defendant to pay a
reasonable amount in settlement: the threat of forcing an exchange at
a price set by a jury.54 The standard economic model of settlement
implies this result directly.55 Under this model, parties settle for the
plaintiffs expected gain at trial because the plaintiff can credibly
threaten the defendant with an equivalent loss. A plaintiff who cannot
get to trial can threaten a defendant only with additional litigation
costs or other secondary costs. As Judge Young wrote:
Once trial is no longer a realistic alternative, bargaining shifts in ways that inevitably
favor the defense. After all, a major goal of nearly every defendant is to avoid a public
jury trial of the plaintiffs claims. Fact-finding is relegated to a subsidiary role, and
bargaining focuses instead on ability to pay, the economic consequences of the litigation,
and the terms of the minimum payout necessary to extinguish the plaintiffs claims. 5 6
In theory, a plaintiff caught up in an MDL can threaten a
defendant with a trial in the original forum. Once a case is fully
prepared, an MDL judge is supposed to send it back to the transferor
court. In fact, however, remand is exceedingly unlikely. "[I]t is almost
a point of honor among transferee judges . .. that cases . . . shall be
settled rather than sent back to their home courts for trial."57 Even
Judge Fallon, a proponent of MDLs, admits that "the centralized
forum can resemble a 'black hole,' into which cases are transferred
53. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998).
54. The same problem arises in so-called "settlement-only classes," where returns are often
meager because class counsel cannot credibly threaten defendants with class-wide judgments at
trial. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 399 (2000) (arguing that claimants
and class counsel are "disarmed" in settlement-only classes because they cannot threaten the
defendant with a class-wide judgment at trial). The U.S. Supreme Court made the same point in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, pointing out that a consequence of "permitting class
designation despite the impossibility of litigation" would be that "class counsel ... would be
disarmed." 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
55. John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1973).
56. DeLaventura, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
57. Id. at 150, 152. An empirical study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center reports
that 82.5 percent of all non-asbestos products liability cases closed in the MDL courts to which
they were referred. Emery G. Lee, Margaret Williams, Richard A. Nagareda, Joe S. Cecil,
Thomas E. Willging & Kevin M. Scott, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation in
Federal Civil Litigation: An Empirical Investigation 48 (Aug. 3, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1443375. Although this implies an 11.5 percent remand rate, the figure
is misleading. Six MDLs account for the vast majority of the remands. Id. at 17-18. Unless an
entire MDL fails, a plaintiff involved in an MDL has little chance of obtaining a remand.
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never to be heard from again."58 Being stuck forever in a court that
cannot preside over a trial and that wants a global settlement at all
costs, plaintiffs caught up in MDLs have little bargaining leverage. No
wonder "[d]efendants generally want centralization; plaintiffs
generally don't."5 9
2. The Implied Consent Requirement
Differing purposes also explain why claimants can opt out of
class actions but not MDLs. Allowing opt-outs in class actions enables
class members with viable claims to proceed separately when this
strategy is best for them. It is therefore consistent with the core
purpose of the class action, which is to help claimants who are better
off as part of a group. By contrast, allowing opt-outs would defeat the
core function of the MDL, which is to conserve resources by
consolidating as many lawsuits as possible in a single forum. Because
MDLs disadvantage claimants, many would head for the exits if opt-
outs were allowed.
The bar on opt-outs also undermines attempts to apply the
common fund doctrine in MDLs, as the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment observes. 60 By voluntarily
remaining in a class when given the right to opt out, class members
lend a degree of consent to the requirement of paying fees. "The class
members' right. . . to opt out . .. tends to resolve, insofar as
practicable, remaining objections on the score of forced exchange."6'
No implication of consent arises in MDLs because no opt-out right
exists.62
3. The Impracticability of Bargaining Requirement
The law of restitution bars forced compensation when
producers and recipients can bargain directly. When bargaining is
58. Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2330 (2008).
59. DeLaventura, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2004) ("By comparison with [fee awards in] class actions, court-imposed fees to
appointed counsel in consolidated litigation frequently appear inconsistent with restitution
principles, since litigants may have no choice but to accept and pay for certain legal services as
directed by the court.").
61. Id. However, the idea of implied consent appears largely fictional in this context, given
that most class members fail to opt out because of simple inertia.
62. Silver, supra note 25, at 499.
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practicable, producers who wish to be paid for their services must
negotiate for payments. 63
In class actions, bargaining normally is impracticable. Claims
are too small to justify the cost of negotiating, and claimants'
identities and whereabouts are unknown. The numerosity
requirement highlights this difficulty. As the Restatement explains:
The fundamental premise of class certification-that the class is too numerous to permit
individual joinder-tends to support a critical element of the restitution claim in these
circumstances, namely, that the claimant was justified in proceeding in the absence of
contract with the defendant (here, the individual class member or common-fund
"beneficiary"). 6
4
No analogue to the numerosity requirement applies to MDLs.
Nor, if one existed, would it be met. All plaintiffs' names and
addresses are known because all have sued. The names and addresses
of all lawyers are known too, making it practicable for lead lawyers
and limited lawyers to bargain face-to-face. 65
A corollary of the impracticability of bargaining requirement is
the doctrine that a provider who could have negotiated with all
beneficiaries but chose to negotiate only with some is fully
compensated when in receipt of the contracted-for fee the willing
beneficiaries agreed to pay. As the Restatement observes:
A further difficulty [with claims for common fund compensation] stems from the fact
that the lawyer's involvement . .. usually has a contractual basis from the outset, in the
agreement with the clients by whom the lawyer is retained. The lawyer's subsequent
claim to recover an additional fee from nonclients, over and above what the clients have
agreed to pay, will therefore encounter the objection that there is no unjust enrichment
if the [lawyer] has been compensated, pursuant to contract, for the performance in
question; no entitlement to restitution in respect of incidental benefits resulting from
compensated employment that the claimant is free to undertake or to decline.
6 6
63. "The law's strong preference for contractual over restitutionary liability accounts for the
general rule by which a person who seeks compensation for benefits conferred on another . . .
must ordinarily found the claim on an agreement with the recipient." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
64. Id. § 30 cmt. b ("The fundamental premise of class certification-that the class is too
numerous to permit individual joinder-tends to support a critical element of the restitution
claim in these circumstances, namely, that the [fee] claimant [here, class counsel] was justified
in proceeding in the absence of contract with the defendant (here, the individual class member or
common-fund 'beneficiary').").
65. MDLs may create some bargaining impediments that do not exist in their absence. For
example, in an MDL, lead lawyers and limited lawyers are caught up in a bilateral monopoly.
Once appointed by a court, lead lawyers are the only sellers of CBW and limited lawyers are the
only buyers. Efficient exchanges are difficult to negotiate in this environment. Before an MDL is
created, this problem does not exist. Any lawyer can offer to provide CBW, and any lawyer can
agree to buy it.
66. Id. § 30 cmt. a.
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The intuition is simple. If the fees the signed clients agreed to pay
were insufficient to cover the work required to represent them, the
lawyer had the option of negotiating to receive additional fees from
other claimants or attorneys. Because the lawyer failed to do that, an
inference arises that the signed clients' fees were large enough to
justify the work required to represent them. This weakens the case for
forcing supplemental payments.
In MDLs, the possibility of forming larger litigation groups
voluntarily is clear. Many or most plaintiffs participate in such
groups. For example, about two thousand clients were represented by
lawyers belonging to the Vioxx Litigation Consortium ("VLC"), a group
of cooperating attorneys. Other lawyers also represented large client
groups. Nothing prevented the lawyers from joining forces to create
even bigger groups. In fact, enormous coalitions sometimes form. In In
re Polybutylene Plumbing Litigation,67 forty-nine law firms collectively
represented about thirty-seven thousand plaintiffs, with a single firm
taking the helm on most claimants' behalf. The firms shared fees
pursuant to contractual referral fee agreements. When mergers fail to
occur, then, the logical inference is that the lawyers see too little
advantage. They expect the groups they represent separately to
generate sufficient recoveries and fees to justify the work.
4. The Passive Beneficiary Requirement
The common fund doctrine generally disallows demands for
forced payments from claimants who hire their own attorneys.68 Only
67. 23 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 Dist.] 2000). The famous MER/29 litigation
provides another example of managing mass litigation contractually. See Paul D. Rheingold, The
MERI 29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116, 123
(1968) (describing mass defective products litigation in which 288 lawyers or law firms formed a
group to finance discovery and other litigation activities).
68. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 770 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[A]s a
general rule, if the third parties hire their own attorneys and appear in the litigation, the
original claimant cannot shift to them his attorney's fees."); id. at 771-72 ("[T]he reimbursement
of the representative attorneys beyond the terms of their individual contracts was limited to that
portion of the fund allocated to beneficiaries which had not participated in the suit [by hiring
attorneys of their own]."); Nolte v. Hudson, 47 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1931) ("[W]here [litigants]
are represented by counsel of their own choice, who do in fact act for them, they cannot be
compelled to share in the expenses incurred by the employment of other counsel by other
[litigants]." (citation omitted)); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Freeman, 447 So. 2d
757, 759 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (The common fund doctrine does not apply to "one who joins as a
party in the suit, assists in the prosecution or contributes toward the expense of the recovery of
the fund. . . ."); Valder Law Offices v. Keenan Law Firm, 129 P.3d 966, 972 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding common benefit fees could not be assessed on party "[b]ecause of the presence of counsel,
actively involved on behalf of [the client]"); Draper v. Aceto, 33 P.3d 479, 484 (Cal. 2001) (" '[A]
court may award attorney's fees from a common fund to an attorney who has succeeded in
preserving a fund when equity requires it,' but. . . 'this cannot be done when there are multiple
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claimants who sit on their hands, as absent class members normally
do, can be made to pay. As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment explains:
Common-fund recovery is rarely available from a party who has retained and paid his
own legal counsel. While the difficulty of comparing the lawyers' respective
contributions is presumably part of the explanation, the more influential fact is simply
that such a party cannot be characterized as a passive recipient of benefits provided by
others.
6 9
There are no "passive recipient[s] of benefits" in MDLs because all
claimants are outfitted with lawyers. 70
The passivity requirement plays two roles. First, it identifies
free-riders, i.e., people who could help bear the cost of producing a
common benefit but choose not to, knowing they will enjoy the benefit
whether they contribute or not. Obviously, claimants who hire
attorneys are not free-riders. They agree to bear the cost of producing
their gains. Nor are claimants' disabled lawyers free-riders. The
lawyers do not choose to refrain from performing CBW when offered
the chance. They are prevented from doing so by MDL judges and lead
lawyers, who force them to the sidelines.
Second, the passivity requirement frees judges from having to
decide how much any individual lawyer contributed to the outcome.
Entirely lost in the quasi-class action cases-where judges may
beneficiaries of the fund and all-or substantially all-are represented by various counsel.' "
(quoting Estate of Korthe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 465, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)); Steinberg v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 276 Cal. Rptr. 32, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("The [common fund] doctrine does not apply ...
when each party has retained counsel, and each counsel actively prosecuted the case or actively
participated in creation of the settlement."); Estate of Korthe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 465, 467 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970) (explaining that the accepted rationale for common-fund recovery "applies only where
a single beneficiary undertakes the risk and expense of litigation while the remaining
beneficiaries sit on their hands"); Means v. Montana Power Co., 625 P.2d 32, 37 (Mont. 1981)
("[O]nly inactive or passive beneficiaries should be forced to bear the costs of litigation under the
common fund doctrine."); Estate of Kierstead, 237 N.W. 299, 300 (Neb. 1931) (denying recovery,
notwithstanding "substantial benefit" conferred on defendants, where claimants "were notified
that the defendants had employed another as their attorney"); Hurst v. Cavanaugh, No. 90-J-7,
1992 WL 208918, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1992) (holding that common fund doctrine cannot
apply to persons represented by counsel who were active in the litigation); Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 541 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tenn. 1976) (The common fund doctrine "is never applied against
persons who have employed counsel on their own account to represent their interests."); DuPont
v. Shackelford, 369 S.E.2d 673, 677 (Va. 1988) (explaining there are no "free rides" where all
parties are represented by counsel); see also Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and
Application of "Common Fund" Doctrine in Allocating Attorneys' Fees Among Multiple Attorneys
Whose Efforts Were Unequal in Benefiting Multiple Claimants, 42 A.L.R. FED. 134 § 2b (2005)
(explaining that the common benefit doctrine does not "permit the allowance of fees from a fund
created where all parties interested are represented by counsel of their own selection, each
counsel in such case being required to look to his own client for compensation") (emphasis added).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2004).
70. Id.
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oversee the division of fees among more than one hundred law firms-
is that when many hands contribute to a successful result, courts of
equity typically refuse to ask how much each person contributed. The
common fund doctrine reflects this traditional constraint. It applies
only when "the beneficiary, whether in person or by counsel, has made
no significant contribution to the transaction by which the common
fund is created, preserved, or enlarged."7' When everyone contributes
something of importance, no one receives restitution from anyone else.
In class actions, the "many hands" problem rarely arises. Most
class members are entirely passive. They do not have lawyers and, a
fortiori, they do not have lawyers who contribute in any significant
way to the eventual result. Class counsel does all the work and
deserves all the credit.
In MDLs, by contrast, "[t]he common benefit lawyers simply do
not do 100% of the legal work."7 2 All lawyers contribute to the final
result. Although lead attorneys understandably cast themselves as
heroes, non-lead attorneys provide essential services too. 73 To see this,
one need only consider the sources of bargaining leverage plaintiffs
have in MDLs, perhaps the most significant of which are the number
of claims and their quality. Non-lead lawyers help create this leverage
by identifying and activating potential clients, evaluating their claims,
contracting with them, and filing lawsuits for them. For example, the
VLC reviewed 30,000 potential claimants, of whom it agreed to
represent only 2,000. The screening process consumed 126,000 work
hours by staff and paralegals, 10,000 hours by nurse practitioners,
23,300 hours by attorneys, and 850 hours by physicians and other
medical experts. The VLC's out-of-pocket cost was $13.5 million. 74 It is
impossible to know how much the VLC's efforts strengthened the
position of the plaintiffs in the negotiations that produced the global
settlement, but they clearly added something.
71. Id. § 30(3)(c) (emphasis added).
72. William B. Rubenstein, On What A "Common Benefit Fee" Is, Is Not, and Should Be, 3
CLASS ACTION ATT'Y FEE DIG. 87, 89 (2009).
73. Prevailing practices in MDLs recognize this by reimbursing many non-lead lawyers for
expenses incurred in connection with services deemed to be of common benefit to all
claimants. See Pre-Trial Order No. 51, ln re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La.
Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://vioxx.1aed.uscourts.gov/Orders/PTO51.pdf (same); Transcript
of Status Conference at 43, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Sept. 17,
2009) (on file with author) (indicating that 112 lawyers applied for reimbursement of common
benefit costs).
74. Affidavit of Walter Umphrey, Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration/Revision of Order Capping Contingency Fees and Alternatively for Entry of
Judgment at 31, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2008).
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Non-lead lawyers may also create bargaining leverage by
keeping clients out of MDLs. This strategy, which forces defendants to
do battle on several fronts, preserves the possibility of obtaining trial
verdicts in state courts chosen by plaintiffs. For example, by keeping
their clients' cases out of the Vioxx MDL, non-lead lawyers forced
Merck to defend thirteen trials "before juries in state courts in New
Jersey, California, Texas, Alabama, Illinois, and Florida."75 Some of
these trials produced enormous verdicts, pressuring Merck to pay
more in settlement.76
Non-lead lawyers also provide valuable services that are more
mundane. They develop the history of each client's exposure to or use
of a product and the details of each client's injury. In Vioxx, for
example, the MDL court required plaintiffs claiming cardiovascular
injury to provide medical information and to authorize the release of
medical records. Disabled lawyers helped clients with these tasks.
Disabled lawyers must also ensure that lead attorneys obtain
discovery and brief legal issues bearing on unique aspects of their
clients' claims, such as causation of illnesses that are relatively
uncommon. Finally, they also advise clients about the costs and
benefits of settling and help those who wish to settle to file claims.
Because many hands contribute to the success of MDLs, doling
out shares in common fund fee awards is unavoidably messy. Each
fee-seeking attorney casts himself or herself in the best possible light
and minimizes the contributions of others.77 Matters are even worse
when, as often happens, a global settlement resolves cases pending in
diverse courts, for judges may then have to evaluate contributions
made by lawyers in other forums.
As stated, the law of restitution generally refuses to ask judges
to allocate credit equitably. It may authorize transfers from a free-
riding lawyer to a hardworking attorney, but not from one
hardworking attorney to another. This is true even if one lawyer
75. Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 58, at 2335.
76. See, e.g., Vioxx Jury Adds $9 Million in Punishing Merck (National Public Radio
broadcast Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyld=5336787&ps=rs (reporting that a New Jersey jury added $9 million in punitive
damages to a $4.5 million compensatory award in favor of a Vioxx plaintiff); Aaron Smith, Jury:
Merck negligent, CNN MONEY, Aug. 22, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/19/news/
fortune500/vioxx/index.htm (reporting that a Texas jury ordered Merck to pay $253 million in
compensatory and punitive damages to a Vioxx plaintiff).
77. Fee applications always make attorneys' efforts seem heroic. For a standard example of
the genre, see Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of
Plaintiffs' Common Benefit Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 52-66, In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2009), and see also Curtis & Resnik, supra
note 46, at 448, who state that "assessing the value of contributions of a multitude of attorneys to
a particular outcome is very difficult."
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"performed the greater part of the work."78 The massive allocation
schemes found in MDLs today-schemes that transfer funds among
tens or hundreds of lawyers, each of whom may have made important
contributions-go well beyond the traditional bounds of equity. MDL
judges are presiding over sizeable business ventures, not doling out
restitution.
The seminal case supporting the application of the common
fund doctrine in MDLs, In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades
on December 29, 1972 ("Everglades Crash"),79 does not justify these
reallocations. The Fifth Circuit's decision to affirm an award of about
$270,000 turned on two facts: the trial judge allowed all lawyers with
cases in the MDL to help develop the litigation (i.e., no lawyers were
disabled), and only lawyers who elected to free-ride when given the
opportunity to help were required to pay. "[T]he [trial] court . .. made
clear . . . that all counsel were free to participate in discovery"; the
lawyers taxed to pay the lead attorneys "conceded" that they allowed
others to do the work.80 "The district judge . . . exclud[ed] . . . attorneys
who continued to be active" in the litigation from having to pay.81
Limiting the tax to lawyers "who elected not to participate in the pre-
trial activities" made the forced exchange more palatable and limited
the burden to true free-riders. 82
Everglades Crash provides little authority for modern MDL
practices. Today, judges prevent many or most lawyers from helping
with discovery or performing other CBW. They then tax all lawyers-
including those who provide no, little, or much CBW-to create a fund
from which common benefit fees can be paid. They then decide which
lawyers provided how much CBW (including lawyers who performed
beneficial work outside an MDL, such as by trying stand-alone cases
to verdicts) and how much each lawyer's effort is worth. The
Everglades Crash trial judge addressed a simple problem of unjust
enrichment created when two lawyers voluntarily chose to free-ride
instead of rolling up their sleeves and pitching in.83 Today's MDL
judges run businesses which they design and control, allocating
responsibilities and rewards as they deem appropriate. 84
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30(3)(c), cmt. e, illus.
21 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
79. 549 F.2d 1006, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Everglades Crash].
80. Id. at 1009.
81. Id. at 1019.
82. Id. at 1020.
83. Id. at 1011.
84. Despite the limited precedential value of Everglades Crash, the 8 percent fee awarded
by the trial judge appears to be taking on a life of its own. In the Vioxx MDL, also pending in the
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D. Using Control of an MDL to Increase One's Compensation
As explained, lead attorneys are fiduciaries who must put the
interests of claimants and non-lead lawyers ahead of their own.
Recently, however, lead attorneys have used their control of
settlement negotiations to increase their compensation. They have
built favorable fee and cost-reimbursement provisions into global
settlements and have required claimants and non-lead attorneys to
waive any objections they may have to these provisions as a condition
for participating. Judges know about this behavior but have not
condemned it. Some have even approved these self-enriching acts.
To understand the lead attorneys' strategy, some background is
required. Seeking a firmer foundation for fee awards in MDLs, some
judges required limited lawyers to sign fee transfer agreements. The
agreements required that moneys be set aside from claimants'
settlement payments for common benefit fees. The amount set aside
was usually small, such as 2 percent for common benefit fees and 1
percent for reimbursement of costs. The agreements also recited the
limited lawyers' desire to be "legally bound."85
From almost every angle, the strategy of using imposed
agreements to legitimate fee and cost transfers was poorly conceived.
The most obvious problem was that the exchanges were forced.
Disabled lawyers could neither choose the managerial lawyers they
wanted nor bargain over terms nor refuse to deal. The less obvious
problem was that the use of agreements undermined the common fund
doctrine, which grants a right to payment only when contracting is
Fifth Circuit, the lead attorneys also request a fee award of 8 percent and cite Everglades Crash
in support. Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of
Plaintiffs' Common Benefit Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 50-51, In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2009). Any serious regulator would reject
this effort to use the earlier case as a template for the later one, the two MDLs presenting
radically different production problems. Everglades Crash involved a small number of persons
killed in an airplane accident, a handful of lawyers, and a common fund fee request for $275,000.
549 F.2d at 1008-09, 1011. The Vioxx MDL contains tens of thousands of persons claiming to
have been injured by a defective drug, lawyers by the hundred, and a demand for over $300
million in common fund fees. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2009 WL 2408884,
at *4-5 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2009).
85. Judges Fallon and Frank promulgated such agreements in Guidant and Vioxx.
Agreement (Full Participation Option) at 1-5, Pre-Trial Order No. 19, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005). Judge Weinstein does not appear to have used
form agreements in Zyprexa. Other judges have done so, however. See, e.g., In re Bextra &
Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1699, 2006 WL 471782, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 27, 2006) (J. Breyer) ("For all cases whose counsel have agreed within 90 days of this
Order to cooperate with the MDL by signing an appropriate agreement . . . the assessment in




impracticable, as previously explained. If the form "agreements" really
were binding contracts, the common fund doctrine had to go. Of
course, if the "agreements" were not binding, their existence changed
nothing.
In practice, however, a different problem emerged: the lead
attorneys wanted more money than the agreements entitled them to
collect. To get around the agreements, which the MDL judges
promulgated at their request, the lead attorneys might have sought
orders increasing the amounts set aside for common benefit
compensation. 86 But this direct approach had an obvious downside: it
would have deprived the fee set-aside of its consensual gloss. Hoping
to preserve the impression that moneys were being withheld by
agreement, the lead attorneys devised a different strategy. They wrote
provisions into the global settlement agreements increasing the set-
asides, and they required disabled lawyers and their clients to waive
objections to these provisions as a condition for enrolling in the
settlements. In short, they used their control of settlement
negotiations to make more money available for themselves.
The strategy worked in Guidant. Although the form
agreements promulgated in that MDL limited the charge for CBW to 4
percent, Judge Frank ordered that 18.5 percent of the $240 million
settlement be set aside for common benefit fees and expenses,
including 14.4 percent ($34.5 million) in common benefit fees.87 When
limited lawyers cried foul, Judge Frank observed that the Guidant
master settlement agreement ("MSA") authorized him to determine
the size of the common benefit fee award.88 To him, this meant that
even if the 4 percent cap once was binding, "the terms of the MSA
contracted around it."89
86. This approach was taken in Bextra. See Pretrial Order No. 8A: Amendment to Order
Establishing Common Benefit Fund at 4, In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod.
Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1699 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2008) (amending Pretrial Order No. 8 and
increasing the set aside for common benefit fees from 4 percent to 8 percent).
87. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2008 WL 451076, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2008). The order set aside $10 million in cost
reimbursements, only $3.5 million of which was slated to cover the managerial attorneys' out of
pocket expenses. Id.
88. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2008 WL 682174, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (observing that "a common benefit payment
from the Settlement Fund is expressly contemplated by the terms of the MSA").
89. Id. Judge Frank also argued that the form agreements allowed the managerial lawyers
to apply for more than 4 percent in "class action attorneys' fees." In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *11 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). The observation was irrelevant, however, because no class action was
certified, or even sought to be certified, in the Guidant MDL, as Judge Frank knew. Id.
(observing that "the Plaintiffs did not ultimately seek class certification"). Judge Frank's real
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Judge Frank's analysis is troubling. The Guidant MSA neither
mentioned the 4 percent cap nor gave any indication that it would be
exceeded. Because the MSA was silent, the limited lawyers appear to
have been blindsided. They did not know they had consented to a
common benefit fee increase when they enrolled clients in the
settlement, assuming they had indeed consented.
A more fundamental concern is that by "contracting around"
the form agreements, the lead attorneys used their control of
settlement negotiations to enrich themselves. This was opportunistic
behavior that violated their fiduciary duty to put others' interests
ahead of their own. Instead of rewarding the managerial attorneys for
"contracting around" the agreements, Judge Frank should have
chastised them. Worse, by involving Boston Scientific Corporation, the
defendant, in the process of increasing the 4 percent ceiling, the lead
attorneys gave the defendant bargaining leverage. Boston Scientific
knew the lead lawyers needed its help to obtain a fee increase.
Presumably, it conditioned its agreement on some concession it would
not otherwise have obtained.
When a lawyer representing a plaintiff bargains with a
defendant over fees, a conflict arises.90 This is well understood in class
actions. When a defendant controls the amount class counsel is paid,
the defendant can offer "red-carpet treatment on fees" in return for
favorable terms elsewhere. 91 In other words, the defendant can trade
higher fees for lower relief. Class counsel is willing to play along
because class counsel receives the fee, not the relief. Courts and
commentators have highlighted this conflict repeatedly. 92 Professor
point was that he never expected the form agreements to limit his powers. Id. (observing that
"the Court ... contemplate[d] additional common benefit payments in the event of settlement").
90. Lester Brickman, Contingency-Fee Con-Men, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2007, at Al8 ("It is
beyond cavil that plaintiffs' lawyers negotiating their fees directly with, and separately payable
by, a defendant ... breach lawyers' fiduciary obligations to clients."). Like most conflicts, this one
may be waived by an informed client. In MDLs, the conflict is not even acknowledged, let alone
waived.
91. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 728 (3d Cir. 2001); Weinberger v.
Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991).
92. Multiple judicial decisions condemned the conflict. See, e.g., Zucker v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1066 (2000) ("A
client who employs a lawyer to litigate against a third party has a legitimate interest in having
his lawyer refrain from taking the third party's money in exchange for throwing the fight.").
Academic commentary likewise abounds. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714 (1986) ("Often, the plaintiffs
attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the
plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap
settlement for a high award of attorney's fees."); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the
Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 42-43
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Coffee framed it as problem of "structural collusion" in which class
counsel and a defendant naturally settle on terms that are good for
the negotiators but bad for the class.93
Structural collusion also occurs in MDLs when lead attorneys
use settlement negotiations to "contract around" their "agreements"
with non-lead lawyers. The lead attorneys want the fee increase. The
defendant is happy to offer them "red-carpet treatment on fees"-
higher common benefit fees cost the defendant nothing-in return for
other things, such as a smaller settlement fund, a later funding date,
or a higher participation threshold. An exchange that is mutually
advantageous for the negotiators occurs naturally. When secrecy
makes it difficult for non-participants to monitor negotiations, as
typically is true in MDLs, the conflict is especially "pronounced."94
Only persons not at the bargaining table are harmed. Here, those
persons are claimants and non-lead attorneys.
Emboldened by the success of the lead attorneys in Guidant,
the lawyers in charge of the Vioxx MDL used their control of
settlement negotiations to write extensive fee-related provisions into
the MSA.95 One raised the cap on common benefit fees from 3 percent
to 8 percent, expressly superseding Judge Fallon's order setting the 3
percent cap, and provided that the entire 8 percent would be deducted
from lawyers' contingent fees.96 Another provision authorized a
separate award of common benefit expenses. 97 And yet another
required limited lawyers and their clients to agree to the first two
(2002) (discussing various forms sweetheart deals can take in class actions and mass tort cases);
Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 145 (2001) (describing class action practice as "a world in which lawyers
make fabulous fees for achieving very little," while "defendant-corporations make sweetheart
deals to dispose of serious liability at bargain-basement rates"); Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto
Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 1009,
1016 (2008) ("Self-interested class counsel are willing to settle on the cheap in exchange for
generous attorneys' fees."); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 899, 933 (1996) (observing that class counsel can "entice defendants to reduce their total
payments by providing counsel with generous fees but affording inadequate compensation to the
class").
93. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J.
625, 647-48 (1986-87) (describing how opportunities for structural collusion arise in class
actions); Coffee, supra note 92, at 718.
94. In re Mark M. Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 912 (D.C. 2002).
95. Interestingly, in Bextra the managerial lawyers did not "contract around" their
agreements, but asked the court for an order raising the common benefit set aside instead. See
supra note 86. This was the proper way to proceed, because it did not involve an abuse of the
lead attorneys' control of settlement negotiations.
96. Master Settlement Agreement § 9.2.1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657
(E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007).
97. Id. § 9.2.2.
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provisions as a condition for enrolling in the settlement.98 These
provisions made almost $400 million available to pay for CBW, about
$240 million more than was available under the 3 percent cap, and
insulated the lead attorneys' self-enriching gambit from attack.
The lead attorneys' object is to give the forced fee transfer a
consensual veneer. A memorandum supporting the lead attorneys'
request for $388 million in common benefit fees makes this explicit. It
contends that claimants and non-lead attorneys agreed to the fee
increase by enrolling in the settlement.99 The argument is laughable.
The lead lawyers' job was to build a bridge from litigation to
settlement for the benefit of all claimants and attorneys. They built
the bridge, but they then forbade anyone from crossing it without
paying them a toll. Were a lawyer for a single client to use a
settlement negotiation to extract a fee increase from the client, the
violation of the fiduciary duty would be patent. That the lawyers who
used their control of settlement negotiations to enhance their fees
were lead attorneys in an MDL changes nothing. They used their
position to benefit themselves at the expense of those they were
charged to represent. 100 Conduct of this sort establishes a predicate for
fee forfeiture, not for fee enhancement.101
98. Id. § 1.2.4. By including this provision in the MSA, the lead attorneys in Vioxx breached
their fiduciary duties a second time, the first time being when they used their control of
settlement negotiations to increase the fund available to pay their fees. The lead attorneys
thought the settlement was the best option for many claimants. They therefore knew that
limited attorneys would be ethically bound to enroll at least some clients in the settlement, even
though a lawyer enrolled even a single client had to waive any and all objections to the common
benefit fee and cost provisions. In practical effect, the lead lawyers used limited lawyers'
professional responsibilities to render limited lawyers powerless to oppose their opportunistic
gambit.
99. Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of Plaintiffs'
Common Benefit Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, supra note 77, at 22.
100. Judge Alice Gibney, the trial judge presiding over the state court consolidation of Kugel
Mesh cases in Rhode Island, recently made the conflict that arises when plaintiffs' lawyers
bargain separately over relief for their clients and fees for themselves a fixture of the
negotiations in that case. She expressly authorized the lead attorneys to negotiate a "payment
from [the] defendants . . . separate from and in addition to any payment made to any plaintiff,
which separate payment(s) is intended to be for common benefit attorneys' fees and expenses". In
re All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, No: PC-2008-9999 (Superior Court, Providence, R.I.),
Assented to Assessment Order (R.I. Aug. 11, 2009). The order is ill advised.
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) ("A lawyer
engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be required to forfeit some or all of
the lawyer's compensation for the matter. Considerations relevant to the question of forfeiture
include the gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the
lawyer's work for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy
of other remedies.").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1:107
E. Caps on Contingent Fees
In Vioxx, it is not known whether the managerial attorneys will
receive the entire $388 million or some lesser amount. Judge Fallon
has yet to rule on their compensation. However, he has ruled that
limited lawyers will provide all the money for common-benefit fees,
meaning that claimants will not pay extra for it. In an order capping
all lawyers' charges at 32 percent, he held that fees for CBW "[would]
be deducted from the individual plaintiffs' attorneys' fees."10 2
Assuming Judge Fallon awards the full 8 percent in common benefit
fees, the 32 percent cap on total charges implies that the limited
lawyers will net fees of 24 percent.
Judge Fallon's order caught most lawyers by surprise. He
provided neither notice nor a hearing before capping their fees, even
though his action cost the lawyers about $390 million. 103 Even so, a
disinterested observer might have predicted this move. Judge Fallon
was using Guidant and Zyprexa as models, and lawyers' fees were also
reduced in those cases. Judge Weinstein capped contingent fees at 20
percent for clients who were to receive $5,000 lump-sum payments
and at 35 percent for clients who were to receive more.104 Judge Frank
initially set contingent fees at 10 percent for managerial attorneys
(who would also receive common benefit fees)105 and at 20 percent for
limited lawyers (who would not). 106 These caps sparked a rebellion,
which Judge Frank ultimately dealt with by setting the total
102. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 (E.D. La. 2008).
103. This assumes an average retainer agreement providing for a fee of 40 percent plus costs.
In failing to give adequate notice, Judge Fallon also followed Judge Frank, who capped disabled
lawyers' contingent fees in an order the main purpose of which was to set the common benefit fee
award. When the disabled lawyers protested, Judge Frank defended himself by asserting that a
footnote to the PSC's fee award submission gave all attorneys notice that their fees might be
reduced. Order Regarding Requests for Motions to Reconsider the Court's March 7, 2008 Order
Regarding Determination of the Common Benefit Attorney Fee Amount and Reasonable
Assessment of Attorney Fees at 3, In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. MDL 05-1708 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2008). The footnote, which merely pointed out the
Court's power to evaluate contingent fee agreements, was plainly inadequate. It neither said
limited lawyers' fee agreements were unreasonable nor asked the Court to impose a fee cap.
Judge Frank also stated that the lawyers who complained of lack of notice "should [have been]
well aware of the case law supporting the Court's inherent right and responsibility to review
contingency fee contracts for fairness." Id. at 3 n.2. Obviously, the knowledge that a court can
review a contingent fee is no substitute for notice that it will do so at a particular time.
104. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
105. Order Regarding Determination of the Common Benefit Attorney Fee Amount at 5, In
re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708 (D. Minn. Feb.
15, 2008).
106. Memorandum Opinion and Amended Order Regarding Determination of the Common
Benefit Attorney Fee Amount and Reasonable Assessment of Attorney Fees at 48, In re Guidant
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
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allowable charge for any client, including the cost of CBW, at the
lesser of the contractual fee, the state-imposed fee limit, or 37.18
percent of the client's gross recovery.107 He rejected an across-the-
board cap of 25 percent proposed by two Special Masters.108
Noticeably, the caps varied greatly. Judge Weinstein's 35
percent cap was considerably higher than Judge Fallon's 24 percent
cap. The caps set or recommended in Guidant fell between these
extremes. One might think the caps varied because the judges tailored
them to the unique facts of their MDLs. The procedures they employed
eliminate this possibility. The caps differed for no better reason than
that the judges chose different numbers.
The stated reason for capping fees in MDLs is that aggregation
reduces lawyers' costs by generating economies of scale. 109 This is
plausible. Standing alone, however, scale economies do not justify fee
cuts. To see why, one must understand two things: first, aggregation is
predictable; second, lawyers compete for clients in competitive
markets. In combination, these factors should cause lawyers to pass
the benefits of scale economies onto clients without any prodding from
judges.
107. Thirteen law firms urged Judge Frank to reconsider his ruling. Id. at 1-2 n.1. Notably,
the group of objectors included the entire Lead Counsel Committee (LCC). Id. Judge Frank stuck
to his guns. Thereafter, sixty-seven attorneys or law firms filed requests with the Court's Special
Masters to increase their fees from 20 percent to 33 percent, as Judge Frank had allowed them to
do. This group also included members of the LCC. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 3896006, at *3 n.8 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008).
Overwhelmed by the flood of requests, the Special Masters urged Judge Frank to raise the cap to
25 percent for all lawyers across the board. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 3896018, at *1 (D. Minn. June 30, 2008). Judge Frank
rejected their recommendation because it would have required some clients to pay more in total
fees than their contracts required. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 3896006, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008). To ensure that no
client paid more than the contract price, he imposed the cap described in the text.
108. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2008 WL 3896006, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008).
109. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[Mluch
of the discovery work [limited lawyers] would normally have done on a retail basis in individual
cases has been done at a reduced cost on a wholesale basis by the plaintiffs' steering
committee."); see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *18 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) ("Because of the mass nature of
this MDL, the fact that several firms/attorneys benefited from economies of scale, and the fact
that many did or should have benefited in different degrees from the coordinated discovery,
motion practice, and/or global settlement negotiations, there is a high likelihood that the
previously negotiated contingency fee contracts would result in excessive fees."); Order &
Reasons at 19, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008) ("[T]he
Court must assess the reasonableness of the contingent fees in light of the fact that the
economies of scale have led to a global settlement offering considerable benefit to the
attorneys.").
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Regarding predictability, when widely sold drugs or other
products impose harms on large populations, claimant groups always
form. 110 MDLs are also predictable.1 ' Every experienced lawyer knew
the JPML would designate MDL courts to handle the cases involving
Vioxx, Guidant defibrillators, and Zyprexa.
That the market for legal services is highly competitive any
mass tort lawyer can also attest. When news breaks of a possible mass
tort, advertising lawyers shift into high gear, referral networks
activate, and competition for clients begins. Over 1,100 law firms
participated in the Vioxx litigation alone.112 Barriers to entry are low.
Any lawyer can advertise on a website or in a newspaper, and many
do. Potential plaintiffs can easily use the Internet to find law firms
willing to handle drug-related cases. They can also comparison shop
by allowing multiple firms to compete for their cases. 113 In an expert
report submitted in the Vioxx MDL, Professor Joshua D. Wright
reported that 1,832 different firms participated in products liability
MDLs from 2004 to 2008.114 He concluded that market failure was not
a practical possibility.115
As a matter of economic theory, then, scale economies
(assuming they exist) provide no justification for fee cuts. Market
pressure should force lawyers competing for products liability cases to
price their services efficiently. Even if the theoretical case were less
clear-cut, however, it would remain to determine how large judicially
imposed fee reductions should be. To answer that question, one would
have to quantify the extent to which prices were inflated. In an
antitrust case alleging overcharges for goods or services, this
determination would require testimony from an expert economist or
110. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004).
111. It is common knowledge that "the MDL panel ... overwhelmingly favors the procedure
it administers. Thus, once the MDL panel decides to consider a matter pursuant to Section
1407(a), transfer is more than likely." DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d
147, 150 (D. Mass. 2006). One study finds that transfer and consolidation are overwhelmingly
likely in products liability cases with multiple cases filed when the defendant supports the
motion. Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, Making Book on the MDL Panel: Will It Centralize
Your Products Liability Cases?, 8 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 110 (Feb. 9, 2007).
112. Status Conference at 22, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Dec.
10, 2008).
113. See, e.g., An Attorney for You, http://www.anattorneyforyou.com (last visited Nov. 12,
2009) (website enabling consumers to obtain offers of representation from competing law firms).
114. Affidavit of Joshua D. Wright, Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration/Revision of Order Capping Contingency Fees and Alternatively for Entry of




accountant based on an established methodology.116 Yet, when
concluding that lawyers' fees were hundreds of millions of dollars too
high, Judges Fallon, Frank, and Weinstein considered no evidence of
this type-or any other. They appear to have thought that a court
exercising its inherent power needs neither a sound methodology nor
competent evidence when cutting fees. This cannot be right. The
efficient price for legal services is an empirical matter, and judges
cannot properly resolve empirical matters by means of armchair
speculation.
The variation in fee caps across the three MDLs thus reflects
mainly the judges' differing intuitions about the fees disabled lawyers
can reasonably charge. The variation may also reflect other
considerations, such as the size of the reduction each judge thought
the limited attorneys in his MDL would accept without making a fuss.
Although the fee caps varied, the judges' desire to protect
plaintiffs from excessive charges served as a constant theme in all
three cases. Each judge wanted to reduce plaintiffs' litigation costs.
When combined with the desire to pay the managerial attorneys, this
meant that all three judges had to cap limited lawyers' fees at levels
low enough to free up the money they thought the managerial lawyers
deserved. Other things being equal, a larger payment for CBW
required a lower cap on fees.
In combination, the fee caps and forced payments for CBW
substantially reduced limited lawyers' earnings.117 In Guidant, Judge
Frank calculated that his three-part cap allowed a limited lawyer with
a 40 percent retainer agreement to collect 28 percent of a client's gross
recovery, a discount of 30 percent.118 This understates the impact of
116. THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BAsIcs § 3.03 (2009).
117. To challenge fee caps, lawyers must be willing to run considerable risks. When the VLC
challenged the fee cap in Vioxx, Judge Fallon issued a sua sponte order appointing the Civil
Litigation Clinic at the Tulane Law School to represent their clients' fee-related matters. Order,
In re Vionx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2008), available at
http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/TulaneClinic.pdf. He also ordered the VLC lawyers to send
their clients copies of his order, thereby fomenting animosity between the lawyers and their
clients which did not previously exist. Id. After holding a hearing, Judge Fallon then reaffirmed
his original fee cap order, giving no weight whatever to or even mentioning the evidence and
arguments the VLC submitted. Order, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La.
Aug. 3, 2009). Finally, he entered two further orders the net effect of which was to place all and
only the VLC lawyers' fees in escrow until their challenge to the 32 percent order was resolved,
including the 24 percent fee to which their entitlement was undisputed. Pre-Trial Order No. 49,
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/PTO49.pdf; Pre-Trial Order No. 50, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/
Orders/PTO50.pdf. It is difficult to find a legitimate purpose for any of these measures.
118. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2008 WL 3896006, at *9-10 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008).
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his ruling. Under his cap, a plaintiffs total fee burden could not
exceed 37.18 percent of the gross recovery. If the common benefit fee
equaled 15 percent, simple subtraction shows that the most any
limited lawyer could charge was 22.18 percent. If that is right, then
Judge Frank's cap actually cost a lawyer with a 40 percent contract 45
percent of his fee.
The 32 percent cap set in Vioxx is slightly less draconian, even
assuming Judge Fallon awards the entire 8 percent set aside to the
managerial attorneys. To make room for the 8 percent payment under
the 32 percent cap, a lawyer with a 40 percent contingent fee
agreement would have to charge 24 percent. That amounts to a
substantial 40 percent discount on the contractual rate.
Cuts of 40 to 45 percent fundamentally change the economics of
mass tort representations. Although the matter has not been studied
empirically, it seems obvious that reductions of this magnitude will
influence lawyers' behavior. Presumably, they will have the same
impact as other price and wage controls, which, when set below
market-clearing levels, cause the quantity and quality of goods and
services to decline.119 This will harm claimants by making
representation harder to find and by reducing the value of their cases.
Tort reform groups (and the politicians they sponsor) support limits on
contingent fees for this reason. 120 They know that claimants who
cannot hire lawyers cannot sue. 121
Having said that fee caps dampen lawyers' incentives, we
nonetheless agree that claimants should not have to pay extra for
CBW. All lawyers with clients in an MDL accepted the wages set in
their contracts as compensation for providing all the legal services
119. Caps on prices and wages are the subject of a large literature. For a review of the use of
price controls in the United States, see HUGH ROCKOFF, DRASTIC MEASURES: A HISTORY OF
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-4 (1984). See also Hugh Rockoff, Price
Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2007), http://www.econlib
.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html ("Price ceilings . . . cause shortages."); Thomas Sowell, An
Ancient Fallacy: Price Controls, CAPITALISM MAG., June 27, 2002, http://www.capmag.com/
article.asp?ID=1684 ("It is not just the quantity supplied that declines under price controls.
Quality also declines.").
120. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Tort Reform Texas Style, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 30, 34 (reporting
that Texas Governor Rick Perry, a proponent of tort reform, proposed a cap on contingent fees);
Patrick Danner, Lawyers' Fees Come Under Fire, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 3, 2004, at 1E (reporting
that the Florida Medical Association backed a constitutional amendment capping contingent fees
in medical-liability cases).
121. On the importance of access to counsel as a condition for suing, see Charles Silver &
David A. Hyman, Self-Representation in Paid Bodily Injury Claims in Texas, 1988-2005 (paper
presented at ABA Section of Litigation Symposium on Access to Civil Justice, Dec. 4-5, 2008) (on
file with ABA) (finding that less than 1 percent of paid bodily injury claimants filed lawsuits
without retaining attorneys).
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their clients reasonably required. This compensation should cover the
effort CBW requires. The problem with fee caps is that they reduce
lawyers' fees below market-clearing levels without either a theory of
market failure or empirical evidence of inflated charges-not because
CBW consumes a fraction of the fees claimants agreed to pay.
F. Allocating CBW Payments among Managerial Attorneys
Once the dollars available to pay for CBW are fixed, it remains
to allocate them among the lead attorneys. This can be a messy
process in which lawyers, including lawyers with cases outside an
MDL, compete for shares of a limited fund. 122 In Guidant and Vioxx,
Judges Frank and Fallon appointed fee allocation committees charged
with deciding which lawyers' efforts were worth how much.123 The
conflicts were horrendous. The committees had to value their own
members' work, including work by managerial lawyers with few or
zero signed clients for whom common benefit fees would be the only
reward.124 They also had to evaluate contributions by lawyers whose
work was done outside the MDL. The Guidant allocation committee
was not up to the task. Its report provoked so many complaints that
Judge Frank abandoned it.125
122. Lawyers with cases in state courts share in common benefit fees because global
settlements involve their clients as well as claimants in an MDL. Sometimes, these lawyers must
subject themselves to regulation by an MDL judge as a condition for enrolling their clients in a
global settlement. For example, Sections 9.2.3-9.2.5 of the Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement
provided that Judge Fallon would oversee distribution of common benefit fees, after appointing a
fee allocation committee and in cooperation with other identified judges. Settlement Agreement
§§ 9.2.3-9.2.5, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mastersa.pdf.
123. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708,
2008 WL 451076, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2008); see also Settlement Agreement §§ 9.2.4, In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mastersa.pdf (granting Judge Fallon
authority to establish the Fee Allocation Committee). The allocating committees'
recommendations were subject to judicial review.
124. In Guidant, Judge Frank appointed six lawyers to a Common Benefit Attorney Fee and
Cost Committee: four members of the PSC and two lawyers with cases in both the MDL and the
Minnesota state courts. Guidant, 2008 WL 451076, at *1. In Vioxx, Judge Fallon named nine
lawyers to an Allocation Committee: three members of the Plaintiffs' Executive Committee; two
PSC members; and four attorneys with state court cases. Pre-Trial Order No. 32 at 1-2, In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007), available at
http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/vioxx.pto32.pdf.
125. Order of United States District Court Judge Donovan W. Frank at 1, In re Guidant
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB) (D. Minn.
May, 27, 2008), available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/MDL-Guidant/PretrialMinutes
/2008/080527ord05mdl708.pdf.
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By involving themselves in the fee allocation process, judges
again use class action procedures as models for MDLs. In the famous
Agent Orange case, Judge Weinstein used the lodestar method to
calculate the fee award. 126 His decision specified the amount each
member of the PSC would receive based upon the time each lawyer
put into the case. However, the PSC members had previously agreed
to pool the award and reallocate it according to a plan of their own
devise, the purpose of which was to reward lawyers who rescued the
case from disaster by contributing financial capital late in the day.127
This naturally meant that lawyers who logged many hours but
contributed no capital would receive less than Judge Weinstein
awarded, while lawyers who contributed capital but logged few hours
would receive more. David Dean was one of the lawyers who wound up
on the short end of the stick. He challenged the reallocation on appeal,
and the Second Circuit sided with him, holding that the ultimate
allocation cannot deviate substantially from the trial court's award. 128
The Second Circuit's opinion provoked an obvious criticism:
plaintiffs' attorneys know how to finance large lawsuits better than
judges do, and "fee-splitting agreements that seem outrageous to a
reviewing court may have strong efficiency justifications." 129 When it
comes to fee allocations, the right regulatory stance in both class
actions and MDLs is probably "benign neglect."130 But judges are
missing the opportunity to handle MDLs correctly because they are
importing class action procedures whole-hog. In MDLs, lead attorneys
can allocate fees contractually. They do not need the help of judges,
and judicial interference with their arrangements is likely to do
claimants more harm than good.
The discussion in this Part illustrates how Judges Fallon,
Frank, and Weinstein gave in to the gravitational pull of the class
action model, progressively adapting to MDLs control rules that
evolved in litigation under Rule 23. The judges appointed counsel to
managerial positions, oversaw their performance of those
responsibilities, and set attorneys' fees for members of the quasi-
class-all of which are activities undertaken by judges supervising
class action litigation. Judges have missed the fact that MDLs differ
126. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 218.
128. Id. at 222-23.
129. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness




from class actions in respects that often render class action procedures
inappropriate.
III. OPTIMIZING MANAGERIAL LAWYERS' INCENTIVES
This Part uses simple microeconomic analysis to clarify the role
fee transfers can play in encouraging the optimal provision of CBW. It
also explains why judges are unlikely to regulate managerial lawyers'
incentives correctly and identifies other problems that arise when
judges regulate lead lawyers' compensation.
A. The Basic Economics of CBW
Lead lawyers perform CBW. This category of effort includes all
litigation-related services displaying a property known as jointness:
when produced or performed once, many plaintiffs can use such
services without reducing their value for any other plaintiff. A
deposition of a fact witness could be an example of CBW. Once one
attorney deposes a witness thoroughly, any number of plaintiffs can
use the transcript when developing their claims; the witness need not
be interrogated again. Pleadings, motions, briefs, deposition
summaries, document reviews, electronic databases, document
repositories, trial notebooks, and stipulations can all be examples of
CBW.
Because CBW consists of joint goods and services, its
production raises a problem of collective action. Rather than bear the
cost of CBW, each claimant would prefer to wait for someone else to
produce it and then use it free of charge. If everyone free-rides,
however, everyone suffers, as no CBW is produced. Fortunately, the
problem may have at least a partial solution. Claimants who refuse to
pay for CBW can be denied access to it. Because lawyers do not have
to share their work product with non-clients, they can use contracts to
discourage free-riding.
Contracts are imperfect solutions, however, as they contain two
important defects. First, it is impossible to prevent free-riding
completely. Once a pleading, motion, or other document is filed with a
court or otherwise made publicly available, anyone can obtain it
without paying legal fees. Other work product, even if not publicly
available, may be leaked to persons not entitled to it. Free-riders can
even benefit from CBW they do not physically possess. For example,
suppose Lawyer L produces a new legal theory that strengthens her
clients' claims. This theory may make the defendant willing to pay
more to settle all pending cases, not just Lawyer L's, even if other
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lawyers do not know about that theory. The defendant may pay more
across the board because it expects other lawyers to find out about
Lawyer L's theory or because it expects settlement values to become
publicly known. Because Lawyer L gets no share of others' gains, her
incentive to develop legal theories is diminished.
Second, when claimants form multiple litigation groups, no
single group may want the level of CBW that would be optimal for all
claimants as a whole. Figure I describes this problem. It assumes the
existence of a total population T of identical claimants and a subgroup
R whose members are represented by a common attorney. MRT and
MRR are the marginal return curves for, respectively, T and R. The
total marginal return to T or R from any unit of CBW is the sum of the
marginal gains enjoyed by the claimants who belong to each group. 131
These curves slope downward to the right, reflecting the assumption
that the marginal value of CBW for each claimant declines as the
supply of CBW increases. The marginal cost ("MC") curve for CBW
falls initially as economies of scale are realized, then rises at higher
levels of production as diseconomies set in. Part of the MC curve lies
below MRR and MRT, reflecting the assumption that a positive level of
CBW is optimal for both groups.
131. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387,
388 (1954).
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FIGURE I. OPTIMAL PROVISION OF COMMON BENEFIT WORK
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QR, the point where MRR and MC intersect, is the optimal quantity of
CBW for R. This is the amount of CBW a contract that harmonizes the
interests of R's members and their lawyer would encourage the lawyer
to provide. However, QR would be a suboptimal level of CBW for T. QT,
the optimal quantity of CBW for group T, is identified by the point at
which MRT and MC intersect. Because MRT> MRR, QT> QR.
In theory, cooperation could ameliorate these difficulties. By
joining forces, claimants (or, more realistically, their attorneys) could
form all-encompassing aggregations producing optimal incentives. In
practice, cooperation occurs on an impressive scale but tends to be far
from complete. In Guidant, Vioxx, and Zyprexa, attorneys established
working groups with thousands of clients. But no one group formed to
coordinate all the work, and many small clusters of claimants
remained. This incomplete cooperation poses problems for defendants
and courts, as well as plaintiffs. When thousands of claimants form
tens or hundreds of working groups, defendants and judges must
perform the same or similar work repeatedly. This duplication is





The possibility identified in Figure I, however, is merely that-
a possibility. Whether untapped economies of scale are available in
MDLs is an empirical question. Instead of facilitating the production
of CBW at an optimal level for an entire group, forced aggregation
may saddle claimants with agency costs by putting them at the mercy
of lawyers they cannot control or discharge. MDLs may also
undermine plaintiffs' ability to bargain for payments by saddling them
with lengthy delays and making trials impracticable. By saying that,
in theory, consolidation may provide an opportunity for judges to
improve incentives, we make a limited claim.
B. Judicial Manipulation of Incentives
Figure I greatly simplifies the economics of producing CBW,
but it makes the relevant point. In theory, MDLs have the potential to
improve upon cooperation by aggregating more cases than cooperation
can reach. In terms of Figure I, an MDL creates an opportunity to
move from QR toward QT by making it economically rational to pay a
plaintiffs' attorney for a higher level of production. The opportunity is
not all upside, however. Forced aggregation carries risks as well.
The first point to appreciate is that the lawyer for subgroup R
has a preexisting incentive to provide QR units of CBW. If R's lawyer
was given control of an MDL containing all members of T and was
prohibited from extracting supplemental fees from anyone, R's lawyer
would still find it advantageous to produce QR units of CBW because of
the expected fees from R's members. If all MDL claimants were
allowed to use the CBW, the group as a whole would realize outcome b
in Figure I. In other words, T would enjoy a positive level of CBW with
no supplemental payment.
The second point, related to the first, is that the incentive to
produce QR remains as long as the members of R pay what they
agreed, even if members of T who are not in subgroup R are allowed to
use the CBW for free. There may be good reasons to charge members
of T for access to CBW produced at the expense of subgroup R, but an
incentive to produce CBW for all claimants in an MDL would exist
even without forced transfers.
When it decided Everglades Crash, the Fifth Circuit appears to
have understood that fee transfers are meant to build upon lawyers'
pre-existing incentives. 132 There, the lawyers opposing the forced fee
transfer asked "why [they should have to] pay [the managerial
lawyers]," who had sixty cases in the MDL, "for doing what they would
132. Everglades Crash, 549 F.2d 1006, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977).
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have done anyhow on behalf of their own clients?" 133 The question
posed the economic issue squarely: Why was a supplemental incentive
needed? The Fifth Circuit answered as follows:
It is uncertain that [the managerial] lawyers would have been able to conduct prompt,
orderly, precise and fruitful discovery if there had been a multitude of diligent lawyers
pushing for the front seat and the maximum advantage. The [managerial lawyers'] 60
cases may affect the amount paid them as lead counsel but not the power of the court to
require payment.
13 4
Obviously, the first sentence missed the point. The objecting lawyers
did not dispute the managerial lawyers' right to control discovery.
They questioned the need to pay them extra for conducting discovery,
arguing that the lead lawyers would have expended the same effort for
the benefit of their signed clients anyway. From an economic
perspective, the proper response was that a supplement was needed
(assuming one was) because the lawyers' pre-existing incentives were
suboptimal. The second sentence hits much closer to the mark. It
suggests that MDL judges should take account of incentives to
produce CBW provided by lawyers' signed clients, transferring less
money when fees expected from signed clients are larger. This is what
judges would do if their object was to move from QR to QT.
In fact, MDL judges almost never take account of lawyers' pre-
existing incentives in any explicit way. A rare exception is an opinion
Judge Weinstein issued in Zyprexa in response to the PSC's request
for a second fee award. In the course of denying most of the second
request, he pointed out that three law firms with positions on the PSC
"derived substantial fees from representing individual clients who
settled their claims in the first phase of the [MDL]: Burg Simpson,
Douglas & London, and Seeger Weiss earned $23.5 million, $21.9
million and $78.5 million, respectively."135 The total is just shy of $124
million. Judge Weinstein seems to have thought that the PSC
members had sufficient incentives to provide CBW without additional
fees because their signed clients had paid them so handsomely.
Judge Weinstein may also have given weight to payments from
signed clients when he evaluated the Zyprexa PSC's first application
for fees, which he approved in full. If he did, however, he neither said
so explicitly nor explained how he took account of this information
when deciding how much money to transfer. In these respects, his
behavior is typical. Despite the Fifth Circuit's observation in
Everglades Crash that fees from signed clients bear on the size of
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 1844000, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 2008).
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forced fee transfers, there is no practice of requiring managerial
attorneys to disclose what their signed clients will pay. 136 Nor does
any doctrine tell judges how to use this information should they
happen to have it. "[N]o specific rules" govern the size of common
benefit fees in MDLs, as the judge presiding over the multi-billion
dollar Diet Drugs settlement observed in 2002.137 Awards need only be
"fair and reasonable." 38
This doctrinal vagueness reflects a failure on the part of judges
to articulate a coherent theory of fee transfers in MDLs. Instead of
thinking about MDLs on their own terms, judges have borrowed the
fee jurisprudence of class actions, as previously explained.139 Yet the
analogy to class actions again turns out to be strained. In MDLs,
lawyers often have valuable client inventories. The attorneys on the
Vioxx PSC collectively stand to collect more than $300 million from
their signed clients, even without a common benefit fee award. The
pre-existing incentives of class counsel, by contrast, are usually much
weaker. Class counsel typically has a few signed clients whose claims,
standing alone, scarcely justify the cost of litigation. The problem in
class actions is to create incentives from whole cloth; in MDLs, it is to
enhance pre-existing incentives that may already be quite strong. For
this reason, side-by-side comparisons of fees in class actions and
MDLs are misleading: they ignore the (often substantial) fees
managerial attorneys in MDLs receive from their signed clients. Even
so, judges sometimes justify MDL fee awards by comparing them to
class action awards. 140
136. In Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein learned about the fees the lead attorneys received from
their signed clients indirectly. A special master obtained this information for him. See id. at *5
nn. 12-13 (indicating use of Special Masters in collecting evidence).
137. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 553
F. Supp. 2d 442, 492 (E.D. Pa. 2008); see also Memorandum and Order of United States
Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann at 9, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (JBW)
(RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006) ("fees awarded in common fund cases may not exceed what is
'reasonable' under the circumstances") (quoting Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43,
47 (2d Cir. 2000)).
138. In re Diet Drugs, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
139. See id. (applying factors developed for use when awarding fees in class actions while
observing that the "factors ... do not strictly apply to the MDL because we are not dealing with a
class settlement fund."); see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *16 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (applying
multi-factor approach endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in a class action) (citing In re Xcel Energy,
Inc., Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992-93 (D. Minn. 2005)).
140. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order of United States Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann
at 11-12, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (JBW) (RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006)
(approving the PSC's request for 4 percent of the settlement fund partly because it compared
favorably with the fees awarded in identified class actions with large settlement funds).
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Several factors increase the probability that judges will
misestimate the fee transfers needed to close the gap between QR and
QT. The distance between QR and QT varies both across cases and with
the makeup of managerial attorney groups. Neither QR nor QT can be
directly observed. Accurate assessments of their values would require
serious study by expert economists and open court procedures
allowing cross examination of their testimony. Once appointed,
managerial lawyers have incentives to maximize fee transfers by
understating QR and overstating QT. Judges lack incentives to set
transfers correctly and have other agendas, such as reducing
plaintiffs' contingent fees.
Judges may even use the wrong formula when paying for CBW.
In the vast majority of plaintiff representations, attorneys work for
contingent percentage fees set before any significant work is done. In
MDLs, by contrast, judges pay managerial lawyers for CBW by the
hour at rates set ex post after reviewing their time sheets. They also
apply fee multipliers. The only apparent justification for using this
compensation approach is that judges like it. A justification tied to
plaintiffs' welfare would be more compelling, given that the object of
compensation arrangements is to motivate lawyers to serve clients
well.
C. Judicial Selection of Managerial Attorneys
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA") in 1995, it gave lead plaintiffs the power to
"select and retain" class counsel and relegated trial court judges to the
back seat.141 Congress's decision reflected its belief that a
sophisticated plaintiff with a large financial interest in the outcome of
a lawsuit has an incentive to hire a good attorney at a reasonable rate.
A judge, by contrast, has less information, more limited access to the
legal services market, and no "skin in the game."14 2
In MDLs, however, judges select lead attorneys. The Manual
for Complex Litigation (Fourth) advises MDL judges "to take an active
part in the decision on the appointment of counsel," and it specifically
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78u- 4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2007); see also Cohen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal.,
No. 09-70378, 2009 WL 3681701, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2009) ("The logical interpretation of the
statute's failure to provide an intricate procedure for the district court to follow after rejecting
the lead plaintiffs selection is that the power to select lead counsel remains in the hands of the
lead plaintiff.").
142. Warren Buffett is thought to be the author of this phrase. See, e.g., Answers.com,
http://www.answers.com/topic/skin-in-the-game (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
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discourages them from letting attorneys select their own leaders.143 It
offers two reasons for judicial activism: the desire to ensure adequate
representation, and the need to police lead attorneys' fees.144 Neither
is compelling. By selecting inferior lead lawyers or overpaying for
CBW, lawyers with cases in an MDL would harm their clients and
themselves.145 One should therefore expect them to hire good
managerial attorneys at reasonable rates. Limited lawyers also know
their contemporaries well and interact with them frequently. This
should enable them to make good choices, to monitor performance
effectively, and to set appropriate rates.146 The need for stringent
judicial policing of lead attorneys fees is far from clear.
A skeptic might argue that judicial control actually benefits
judges, who crave interesting, challenging, and high-profile MDL
assignments. The best way to get more assignments from the JPML is
143. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.244 (2004).
144. See id. ("Deferring to proposals by counsel without independent examination ... invites
problems down the road if designated counsel turn out to be unwilling or unable to discharge
their responsibilities satisfactorily or if they incur excessive costs.").
145. Collusion could lead to excessive charges for CBW, as discussed above. See supra, Part
II.D.
146. Commenting on a prior draft of this article, one reader observed that judicial regulation
of lead lawyers' fees in MDLs is a continuing response to the many fee abuses that have occurred
when lawyers were left unsupervised. The reader specifically mentioned the infamous Fine Paper
case, in which a circus erupted after the lead attorney accused other lawyers of committing
various forms of billing fraud in an effort to win as much of the $50 million settlement for
themselves as possible. Following lengthy hearings and a thorough audit, the outraged trial
judge found that the fee applications were "grossly excessive" and cut the total amount requested
by 80 percent. In Re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Coffee,
supra note 129, at 907-10 (discussing the controversy relating to attorneys' fees in Fine Paper).
Fine Paper shows quite clearly that lawyers cannot be allowed to set their own fees. Insofar
as limited lawyers are concerned, this is not a problem in MDLs because their fees are regulated
contractually. The same would be true if fees for CBW were regulated by agreements among
attorneys. Judge Kozinski made a similar point in his dissent in In re FPI/Agretech Securities
Litigation, 105 F.3d 469, 477 (9th Cir. 1997), also an MDL. The question there was whether the
district court judge erred by refusing to enforce a fee sharing agreement among the lead
attorneys. Although Kozinski agreed that judicial control of fees is "entirely appropriate" when
attorneys apply for fee awards from common funds, he thought the fee sharing agreement was a
valid contract and should have been enforced. Id. Noting that "[1]awyers, no less than any others,
are entitled to arrange their affairs by private contract," Kozinski argued that judges must
evaluate common fund fee requests because these requests lack natural bounds. Id. By contrast,
judicial regulation has no place when a valid contract establishes a fee sharing arrangement and
enforcement of the contract would not impact the total amount paid in fees.
Properly considered, Fine Paper actually weighs against the quasi-class action method and in
favor of our proposal. Under existing arrangements, judges rely on lead attorneys to recommend
amounts for common benefit fee awards in MDLs. This encourages abuses of the type that
occurred in Fine Paper and necessitates careful judicial scrutiny of fee requests. Under our
proposal, described in further detail below, lead lawyers' fees would be set upfront by other
lawyers who would suffer if lead lawyers were to overcharge. This would substantially reduce the
need for judicial monitoring.
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by handling prior assignments well. 47 To judges, this means achieving
global settlements that save other judges from having to preside over
follow-on trials, as previously explained. MDL judges may use many
tools to accomplish this end, not just those identified as components of
the quasi-class action method. For example, they may refuse to rule on
motions to remand cases to transferor courts or to state courts from
which they were removed. By leaving remand motions pending, MDL
judges encourage mass tort defendants to remove all state court cases,
increasing the number of cases consolidated in MDL courts and
expanding the reach of judges' power.
The hope of ending all litigation may explain why judges
sometimes give important positions to lawyers with few or no signed
clients. 48 In Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein named Melvyn I. Weiss chair
of the PSC. Weiss's firm had no clients in the MDL, but he was a
consummate settlement architect.149 In Vioxx, Judge Fallon gave the
position of liaison counsel to Russ Herman, whom he also put on the
PSC and the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee and made chair of the
Fee Allocation Committee. When the MDL began, Herman had fewer
signed clients than many other lawyers, but he too was an experienced
deal-maker.
Conflicts can arise when lawyers with few or no clients hold
important positions. Clientless lawyers depend entirely on judges'
largesse. Beholden more to judges than to plaintiffs, they can be
expected to prefer the former over the latter when interests collide.
This may put them at odds with lawyers with valuable client
inventories, causing friction on the plaintiffs' side. The desire of
lawyers with few or no clients to maximize fee transfers is also a
predictable source of strain. Contingent fee lawyers with valuable
inventories have some interest in maximizing recoveries, but
clientless lead lawyers who charge by the hour have none. Their
interest lies in billing as much time as a presiding judge will allow.
Having done that, a clientless lawyer will rationally want to settle on
any terms a defendant will offer. After all, the lawyer has no stake in
the MDL's upside potential, but will suffer greatly if negotiations fail.
147. The criteria that formally govern the JPML's choices of transferee fora are discussed in
David F. Herr, Multidistrict Litigation Manual ch. 7 (2008). According to Herr, "[t]he [JPML]
undoubtedly considers the ability and reputation of a judge" when making assignments, and also
"look[s] specifically to prior experience as a transferee judge in MDL proceedings." Id. § 7.11.
148. See Everglades Crash, 549 F.2d 1006, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977) (commenting that "[iun the
next case the best available lead counsel may have one case out of 100").
149.Original PSC's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for an Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 2 n.2., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596
(JWB) (RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006).
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Judicial control of appointments and fees compromises judges'
independence as well. By appointing managerial attorneys, an MDL
judge begins an iterated relationship with the attorneys that lasts
until the proceeding ends and the lawyers are paid. Every step in the
pre-trial process can build a sense of reciprocity. As the distance
narrows between the judge and the appointed lawyers, it becomes
more and more difficult for the judge to act objectively, which may
mean sending the lawyers home empty-handed or slashing their
fees.150 One might have to involve MDL judges so deeply in plaintiffs'
affairs if there were no better alternative. "You can't beat something
with nothing," as the saying goes. But there are other options, as we
show in Part IV.
D. The Impact of Judicial Fee Regulation on the Profitability of CBW
Because QT is unobservable, it is important to know whether
judges regulate managerial lawyers' compensation in a way that
incentivizes them to optimize production of CBW. It seems they do
not. In Zyprexa, for example, Judge Weinstein disallowed most of the
PSC's supplemental request for $6.5 million in attorneys' fees.
Evidently, he concluded that the PSC had expended more time on
CBW than it should have. If Judge Weinstein was right to deny the
submitted hours, then the method he used to calculate pay for CBW
encouraged attorneys to overproduce, requiring careful oversight to
protect limited attorneys from overbilling.15 1
The likely culprit is the policy of paying for CBW by the
hour.152 This compensation method makes time spent on CBW
especially profitable because it enables managerial lawyers to collect
for the same effort twice. Zyprexa provides an apt example. There,
Judge Weinstein capped lawyers' contingent fees on large cases at 35
percent, granted in full the lead attorneys' request for over $30 million
in common benefit fees and expenses, and generated the money
needed to pay them by imposing a tax against the entire settlement
150. Reciprocity is deeply engrained in humans. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (exploring how cooperation strategies developed and using
game theory to predict results). Even trivial gifts like coffee mugs and pens have been found to
influence decisions.
151. Judicial orders rejecting fee requests from managerial attorneys ex post can, however,
deter managerial lawyers from logging excessive hours in future cases.
152. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order of United States Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann
at 6, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (JBW) (RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006)
(observing that the PSC submitted "detailed time records" for review); id. at 11 (noting that the




fund. The managerial lawyers thus collected 35 percent of the gain
CBW generated for their signed clients plus $30 million from all
settling claimants. The latter group included the lawyers' signed
clients. Not only did the lawyers collect for the same work from two
sources; they charged their own clients twice for the same work. 153
The ability to collect from multiple sources makes CBW more
profitable than it would otherwise be. The magnitude of the increase
depends on the facts. Imagine Lawyer L, who, outside an MDL,
represents 100 identical clients pursuant to 40 percent contingent fee
agreements. Now assume that between Time 1 and Time 2, L expends
1,000 hours on CBW and that this effort increases the expected value
of the signed clients' cases by $2.5 million. L's expected fee on the
CBW is therefore $1 million ($2.5 million * .4 = $1 million), or $1,000
per hour. Assuming a competitive market, this level of compensation
should not enable L to collect any rents. 154
Now assume the following: (1) at Time 1, L's 100 cases are
consolidated in an MDL with 900 identical cases; (2) L is appointed
lead counsel; (3) L devotes the same 1,000 hours to CBW between
Time 1 and Time 2 with the same effect on L's clients' cases; (4) the
court awards L $1,000/hour for this time, or $1 million; and (5) as in
Zyprexa, the court generates money to pay L by taxing every claimant
$1,000. L's total fee for CBW is the sum of his receipts from his signed
clients and the payment awarded by the court, or $1,960,000
((($2,500,000 - $100,000) * .4) + $1,000,000 = $1,960,000). This is
almost double the amount L would have received from his signed
clients alone. L's hourly rate for CBW has increased from $1,000 to
$1,960.
When L's fees and the court-imposed tax are combined, this
arrangement costs L's signed clients more than their contracts
require. The signed clients pay L $960,000 and they pay the court
$100,000, yielding a total of $1,060,000. To protect the clients, a judge
might follow Judge Frank's lead in Guidant by capping their fees at
the contract amount. This would require L to rebate $60,000, and
would reduce his total compensation for CBW to $1,900 per hour.
Obviously, this is still far more than his signed clients alone would
have paid and an excessively profitable rate.
A judge could also follow Judge Fallon's example. In Vioxx,
Judge Fallon capped all clients' fees at 32 percent and required
153. This assumes that time expended on CBW increased the value of claims by more than
$30 million.
154. Rents are payments exceeding wage earners' long-run opportunity costs. See A. Ross
Shepard, Economic Rent and the Industry Supply Curve, 37 S. EcON. J. 209, 209 (1970), for a
further brief explanation of "economic rent."
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managerial lawyers' fees to come out of this amount. On this
approach, L's signed clients would have to pay at most $800,000 ($2.5
million * .32 = $800,000), meaning that L could charge them only
$700,000, assuming no change in the $100,000 tax imposed by the
court. L's total compensation would then be $1.7 million, still 70
percent more than he would have collected outside the MDL.
CBW would have been a profit center even under the cap Judge
Frank first applied in Guidant. This cap allowed managerial lawyers
to charge their clients 10 percent of the amounts they netted after 15
percent of the fund was set aside to pay common benefit fees. Under
this cap, L could have collected $250,000 ($2.5 million * .1 = $250,000)
from his signed clients plus $1 million from the court, yielding $1.25
million in total compensation and an hourly rate of $1,250.
Because the fee transfer mechanism makes time spent on CBW
more profitable, it changes the equilibrium allocation of lawyers' time,
increasing the hours devoted to CBW and decreasing the time
expended on other services. When representing only his signed clients,
a profit-maximizing L would cease producing CBW when the expected
marginal fees from it and other forms of work were equal. In the
example, this point was assumed to be reached when the marginal
return from CBW was $1,000. When appointed lead counsel, L
performs the same comparison but, because CBW is more profitable, L
cuts back on other activities and invests the free time in CBW. If CBW
is worth $1,250 per hour (or any amount that generates rents), L
rejects all other employment opportunities and produces CBW full
time. This incentive persists as long as court-awarded compensation is
flowing; neither QT nor any other quantity provides a natural stopping
point. The profitability of CBW also creates an incentive to fabricate
hours and to characterize as CBW time actually spent on other things.
The potential of the hourly rate to encourage billing fraud is well-
known.
Because neither judges nor anyone else can observe QT, the
profitability of CBW under the standard arrangement will predictably
lead to overcompensation of lead attorneys. Judges appoint lawyers to
lead positions and, having appointed them, rely on them for advice
concerning the amount of time CBW requires. Because the standard
arrangement makes CBW excessively profitable, however, lead
lawyers' assessments will be biased. They will always prefer higher
levels of CBW to lower ones, and will advise judges accordingly.
Claimants' attorneys will have little power to counter lead attorneys'
estimates. Their self-interest in reducing fee transfers will be
apparent; their disagreements with lead attorneys will be subjective;
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and their influence on the court will be weakened by their status as
back-benchers.
To avoid making CBW excessively profitable, a judge would
have to prohibit a lawyer from charging his signed clients for any of
their gains attributable to CBW produced during time for which the
lawyer received payment from the court. Calculating this offset would
be difficult. Plaintiffs' attorneys may not know how much value an
increment of CBW added to their clients' claims. The value of claims
at any given time can only be guessed. Even if they did know, they
would have incentives to misreport because doing so would increase
their fees. In theory, judges could make their own assessments guided
by court-appointed expert economists-an expensive and cumbersome
process that would produce educated guesses, at best.
E. Factors that Matter Other than Fees
To this point, we have focused on fees to the exclusion of other
forces that influence lawyers' willingness to produce CBW. Real
lawyers' motives are complex. Most attorneys, in our experience,
genuinely care about their clients. Even when clients number in the
hundreds or thousands, they want to obtain justice for them and to see
them do well.155 Most plaintiffs' lawyers, again in our experience, also
dislike the defendants they sue. They think drug companies, device
manufacturers, and other producers make obscene profits by deceiving
regulators and exploiting vulnerable consumers. In addition, many
plaintiffs' attorneys enjoy publicity and prestige. They desire higher
standing in their profession for its own sake and because it enhances
their ability to gain clients. Finally, plaintiffs' attorneys also value
opportunities to build litigation skills, to work with other attorneys,
and to develop reputations for winning big cases.
MDLs afford many of the opportunities plaintiffs' attorneys
crave, which is one reason why lead counsel positions are much sought
and highly prized. 15 6 Lead attorneys meet in chambers with judges,
155. Lawyers and clients may also believe that gaining justice includes using MDL
settlements to strengthen policies that protect consumers from defective products. In other
words, private litigation may supplement regulation, which claimants or plaintiffs' attorneys
may think is too weak. We do not consider this motivation in this section, but do not mean to
deny its existence.
156. Lawyers chosen for lead positions routinely advertise the fact. The Vioxx case provides
many examples. See, e.g., About Russ Herman, http://www.hhke.com/apga9 Russ_
M_Herman.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) ("Liaison Counsel and Member of PSC Executive
Committee and In Re Vioxx: MDL1657."); Attorney Profile: Andy D. Birchfield, Jr.,
http://www.beasleyallen.comlattorney/Andy-Birchfield/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) ("In April of
2005, Andy was chosen to co-lead the Plaintiffs Steering Committee for the federal Vioxx
2010]1 155
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
work with the most successful plaintiffs' lawyers in the country,
handle communications within plaintiff groups, meet with lawyers
and judges handling unconsolidated cases, converse directly with
defendants' most influential officers, and talk with the press.
Sometimes, they testify before congressional committees, participate
in Supreme Court cases, or work with high-profile mediators. They are
regularly invited to speak at continuing legal education programs and
conferences, to lecture law students, and to publish articles describing
their experiences in law reviews. Lead attorneys control the flow of
large volumes of business to settlement administrators and expert
witnesses. They may also meet with lawyers and claimants across the
country to provide information, address concerns, and take credit for
their accomplishments. To hold a lead position in a large MDL is to
participate in civil litigation at the highest level.
Lead attorneys also enjoy opportunities to build important
skills. They strategize, develop legal theories, argue motions,
coordinate discovery, take apex depositions, prepare experts, and
design settlement structures. They build document repositories and
create trial notebooks. They preside over or participate in
organizations of claimants' attorneys that may be bigger and
wealthier than their own law firms. These skills and experiences help
lawyers attract future clients and referrals, and obtain judicial
appointments in future MDLs and class actions. They also enhance
lawyers' chances of being invited to collaborate with other attorneys
on large cases.
Lead lawyers in MDLs may also enjoy opportunities to seem
unusually successful. Judicially ordered aggregation can improve the
odds of settling by concentrating lawsuits in a small number of
forums, placing them under unified control, and facilitating
cooperation across courts. Consolidation can thus enable a group of
lead attorneys to claim that their efforts produced an exceptional
outcome that was actually due in some measure to other causes.157
In theory, these non-monetary factors can reduce the need to
pay managerial lawyers for CBW. They can also affect the need to
monitor their actions. Judges are, however, poorly placed to decide
how much weight these factors deserve. The policy of setting
managerial lawyers' fees ex post also ties judges' hands by making it
Litigation MDL."); Firm Overview and History, http://www.1fsblaw.comloverview.jsp (last visited
Nov. 12, 2009) ("Partner Arnold Levin ... continues to serve on Plaintiffs' Steering Committees
and Executive Committees of many important cases including . . . the Vioxx Products Liability
Litigation").
157. Distinguishing between returns for which an agent is responsible and returns
attributable to other causes, usually described as "nature," is a core problem for principals.
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impossible for them to comparison-shop. Having previously appointed
a group of attorneys and allowed them to negotiate a global
settlement, a judge cannot fire the group on the ground that other
lawyers would have charged less because they were more strongly
motivated by other considerations. Realistically, a judge cannot even
reduce a fee award on this ground. Having appointed a group of
attorneys without setting their rates in advance, a judge is bound to
accept their usual and customary charges.
F. Enriching the Economics of Producing CBW:
The Choice of Counsel Matters
The choice of managerial attorneys affects claimants. Some
attorneys are better litigation strategists, negotiators, legal theorists,
advocates, or risk-takers than others. Some teams of attorneys are
better than others, too. Their members respect each other, like each
other, trust each other, cooperate, and avoid unnecessary costs. Figure
II casts the difference between superior and inferior representation as
a difference in the marginal return to T per unit of CBW. Ls is the
superior lawyer or lawyer-group, and its marginal return on effort is
higher. L is the inferior lawyer or lawyer-group, and its marginal
return is lower. Both are assumed to be paid the same hourly wage
(W).








With LI in charge, the claimant group fares best when QLI of
CBW is produced. The net gain to the group after paying I is the
triangle def. With Ls in charge, the optimal level of CBW is QLS, which
is larger than QLI in reflection of Ls's higher marginal return on effort.
The net gain to the group after paying Ls is triangle abf, which
obviously exceeds dcf in size. Given the quality difference, it clearly
matters to claimants whether LI or Ls has control of the case.
Judges, however, have no particular interest in putting MDLs
in the hands of attorneys who are superior providers of CBW. This
should not be surprising: the procedural system does not give judges a
stake in the size of plaintiffs' recoveries. But it does bestow prestige
upon judges who resolve complex cases. Consequently, a judge
overseeing an MDL will want to manage the litigation successfully.1 5 8
Unless the judge is inclined to dismiss all claims, the judge will want
to achieve a global settlement. One must therefore expect a judge to
keep lawyers' settlement-related abilities in mind when deciding
which lawyers will control an MDL.
A judge who wished to appoint a team of superior lawyers
would also face a second hurdle: the judge might not know which
lawyers are best. MDL judges do not scour the continent looking for
attorneys offering the best combination of quality and price. They
usually draw managerial lawyers from a pool of volunteers that
includes mainly lawyers with cases in the MDL (as well as others who
may never have appeared in the MDL court before). If the best
managerial lawyer is not in the pool, the lawyer will not be
appointed. 159 Even within the pool, judges may not know some or
many of the lawyers or have any other solid basis on which to gauge
their abilities.
Even if judges could reliably identify the best lawyers, they
would not know how to incentivize them. Although judges claim the
inherent authority to regulate lawyers' fees, they do not know how or
how much lawyers should be paid. The manner of regulating lead
lawyers' compensation reflects this. Judges pay lead attorneys
contingent hourly rates. In the market for legal services, plaintiffs
158. For a discussion of the possibility that the JPML keeps judges' ability to settle complex
cases in mind when deciding where to locate MDLs, see Marcus, supra note 9, at 2288-89.
159. As previously stated, MDL judges occasionally appoint client-less attorneys to lead
positions. These lawyers seem to always be local attorneys who are known to the court. Judges'
reasons for appointing these lawyers are unknown, but they may be following the MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH). After explaining that the role of liaison counsel is to handle
"administrative matters," the Manual adds that "[1]iaison counsel will usually have offices in the
same locality as the court." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221. Computers
and electronic communications have surely rendered this instruction obsolete.
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rarely use this arrangement. They pay lawyers contingent percentage
fees. Referral fee arrangements also use this structure. Other work-
sharing arrangements use different arrangements, but contingent
hourly rates are only one possibility and, although evidence is hard to
come by, they do not appear to be preferred.160 Where cooperating
plaintiffs' attorneys tailor compensation and cost-sharing
arrangements to their needs, MDL judges use a "one-size-fits-all"
approach. Judges also prohibit lead attorneys from reallocating time-
based income streams, even though reallocations might reasonably be
expected to help plaintiffs by aligning attorneys' interests with
theirs.161
We do not mean to exaggerate the points made in this Section.
As a historical matter, judges have often given control of MDLs to
outstanding attorneys. Because judges enjoy working with successful
lawyers, this should not be surprising. Many lead lawyers have also
had large numbers of signed clients and have represented all
claimants well, which should not be surprising either. Lead lawyers
face considerable pressures from multiple sources to do well. Our point
is not that existing appointment procedures fail routinely; it is that
they have certain systematic defects. They are opaque, and they are
designed to serve judges' interests, not claimants'. Judges should
consider a range of options before settling on those currently in place.
In the next Part, we propose what we believe to be a better way to
manage common benefit work in MDL cases.
IV. THE PMC PROPOSAL
Using a simplified account of the microeconomics of producing
CBW, Part III identified a problem that MDLs have the potential to
address. That problem, as discussed, is also difficult for MDL judges to
resolve. This Part proposes an alternative to judicial control that
seems likely to produce superior results.
160. In the MER/29 litigation, which occurred in the time before MDLs, cooperating lawyers
supported the production of CBW by making a $100 initial payment, a $200 supplement, and an
assessment capped at $1,000 that varied with the number of cases a lawyer was handling.
Rheingold, supra note 67, at 123.
161. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987)
(striking down a fee sharing agreement entered into by members of the class action's PMC that




The portion of the proposal intended as a default rule builds on
the existing model for selecting attorneys in securities class actions.
The PSLRA entitles the so-called "most adequate plaintiff"-
presumptively, the plaintiff with the largest financial stake in the
case-to select and retain counsel for all claimants. In many cases, the
most adequate plaintiff is an institutional investor such as a pension
fund, as discussed in an influential article by Professors Elliot Weiss
and John Beckerman.162 An institutional investor-having both
business sophistication and a lot of money at stake-can be relied on,
at least in theory, to hire a skilled attorney at a competitive price and
to use a fee structure that motivates the lawyer to maximize the net
recovery. Empirical evidence tends to confirm that securities litigation
under the PSLRA framework reduces fees in securities cases without
adversely affecting quality.163
A PSLRA-style mechanism would not be an appropriate way to
select a lead attorney in an MDL like Guidant, Vioxx, or Zyprexa. The
plaintiffs in these cases are individuals, not businesses, and their
ability to evaluate and bargain with attorneys is limited. Compared to
institutional investors in securities fraud cases, their stakes are
minuscule.164
Weiss and Beckerman's intuition can be adapted to MDLs,
however. One need only see that plaintiffs' attorneys can act as
plaintiffs' bargaining agents. A lawyer representing 2,000 identical
signed clients with 40 percent contingent fee agreements has a
financial interest equal to that of 800 clients. Such a lawyer stands to
collect 40 percent of the clients' marginal gains when production of
CBW increases from QR to QT in Figure II. Plaintiffs' attorneys also
know the best lawyers (or can easily learn who they are), have access
to the entire legal services market, understand the risks and gains
associated with mass tort litigation, and have incentives to bargain for
competitive fees. Furthermore, they possess the necessary
sophistication to monitor the production of CBW.
Because a lawyer with a large inventory of signed clients
should rationally want a superior lawyer to provide CBW at a
162. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053,
2105 (1995).
163. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 162, at 2090 (reporting that the mean share of the





reasonable rate, the proposal relies on such a lawyer to select and
retain common benefit counsel ("CBC") for an MDL. After allowing all
lawyers with cases in an MDL to apply, a judge would appoint a
Plaintiffs' Management Committee ("PMC") comprised of the lawyer
or group of cooperating lawyers with the most valuable client
inventory. The PMC would then select a lawyer (or lawyer-team)
outside the PMC to provide CBW for the entire MDL. The PMC would
also set the CBC's compensation, which would be funded by a tax on
the MDL recovery, for the payment of which claimants would receive a
credit against their own attorneys' fees. The CBC's fee would thus be
spread across all lawyers with clients in an MDL in proportion to the
value of the clients' claims. Having the most valuable inventory of
cases, the PMC would have a sizeable stake in both the cost and
quality of CBW. In other words, the PMC would have an incentive to
obtain the CBC offering the best combination of quality and price.
Of course, these desirable incentives and capacities would not
necessarily generate positive results if the PMC members could simply
appoint themselves to perform CBW. Self-appointment would re-
create the conflicts of interest that exist in MDLs today. The harmful
consequences of self-appointment might even outweigh the
improvements in quality and efficiency the proposal is supposed to
afford. Accordingly, the proposal would generally exclude PMC
members from performing CBW except at their own expense. 65 Their
role, instead, would be to (1) select others to do the CBW, (2) set the
CBC's compensation, and (3) monitor the CBC's performance of that
work. If members of the PMC do no CBW, their incentives are
closely-but not perfectly-aligned with those of the claimants and
other attorneys in the case.166
165. PMC members need not always be excluded from providing CBW. Occasionally, a PMC
attorney could be uniquely qualified for a particular job. The proposal might allow exceptions in
these situations, with the consent of other PMC members and the approval of the court.
Presumably, the order granting the exception would identify the services to be performed and set
appropriate limits on its scope. The requirement that PMC members may not perform CBW
except at their own expenses could be waived by agreement among all attorneys.
166. Ex ante, the PMC's incentives would be imperfect because situations could exist in
which the PMC would profit by foregoing opportunities beneficial to claimants. For example,
suppose the PMC could spend $10 million on a CBC expected to generate a $50 million recovery
or $20 million on a CBC expected to produce a $60 million recovery. The claimants, who one may
assume are obligated to pay 40 percent contingent fees, would prefer the latter option, which
generates a net recovery of $36 million to the former, which nets only $30 million. But the PMC
would prefer the latter, which generates a net fee (after paying the CBC) of $10 million ($20
million - $10 million), to the former, which pays them only $4 million ($24 million - $20 million).
After the CBC is hired, however, the PMC's interests would fully align with the claimants'. Both
would ignore the cost of CBW and desire the largest possible recovery.
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The proposal would also allow PMC members to participate
(generally on an unpaid basis) in settlement negotiations without
specific prior judicial authorization. Settlement often is the single
most important event in the life of an MDL, and the proper analysis of
settlement opportunities requires an overview of the litigation as a
whole. With many clients depending on them, PMC members would
have appropriate incentives to work effectively on behalf of all
claimants when negotiating global settlements. To be clear, the PMC
could assign responsibility for settlement negotiations to the CBC. But
it could also retain control of negotiations for itself or give control to
other attorneys. The proposal gives the PMC maximum flexibility.
A judge could also exercise a degree of discretion in selecting
the PMC, subject to the general constraint of assigning control to a
lawyer or lawyer-group with a valuable client inventory. The PSLRA
provides an analogy here. That statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that the candidate with the largest financial interest is
the "most adequate plaintiff."167 A trial judge, however, may give
control to a different candidate (presumably, the named plaintiff with
the second largest stake) if the largest stakeholder "will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."168 The statute identifies
one potential cause of inadequate representation-unique defenses-
but does not exclude other possible causes.
The proposal for MDLs could contain a similar backstop.
Representatives who serve on the PMC would have to demonstrate
their ability to provide adequate and loyal services for the benefit of
all plaintiffs. If a judge believed that a volunteer lacked the capacity to
perform effectively as a member of the PMC, the court would not have
to appoint that person but would have to give reasons for excluding an
otherwise-qualified candidate. For example, in theory, a conflict of
interest could exist between an identifiable set of plaintiffs and the
winner of the competition for control of the PMC. This might be true if
the winner represented no clients of the identified type and,
consequently, had little incentive to develop evidence bearing uniquely
on their claims. Some flexibility in the joints may be needed to address
problems like these. As a condition for competing, judges could require
candidates for the PMC to demonstrate comprehensive representation
of all discrete plaintiff groups after setting out the groups' identities in
an order.169 Obviously, inadequate representation could also be
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
168. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)(aa).
169. The Supreme Court has long been concerned about conflicts of interests in class actions
that threaten to saddle segments of a class with inadequate representation. See, e.g., Ortiz v.
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threatened if the winner of the competition were to die or otherwise
become incapacitated. Ad hoc arrangements could handle problems
like these.170
The court could also exercise discretion in deciding who, among
competing applicants, has the most valuable client inventory.
Ordinarily, size should be a reliable guide. When competing lawyers
have similar mixes of clients and seem otherwise indistinguishable,
the one with the most clients would win. But size may not always be
dispositive for two reasons. First, cases have a range of expected
payoffs and are not necessarily evenly distributed among attorneys.
Some mass tort lawyers specialize in cases with severe injuries, such
as asbestos lawyers, who represent only clients with mesothelioma;
other lawyers assemble large blocks of cases in which less serious
injuries predominate. Some lawyers screen clients carefully before
agreeing to represent them; others accept requests for representation
more readily. And even when cases seem similar, some lawyers obtain
higher values than others. Qualitative factors like these can make the
value of competing lawyers' inventories difficult to compare. Second, a
mechanical rule requiring the appointment of the attorneys with the
largest number of plaintiffs might encourage lawyers to accumulate
clients regardless of the quality of their claims or the severity of their
injuries.171 The fear of an influx of plaintiffs with baseless claims is
not imaginary. Mass tort suits and settlements have attracted
multitudes of persons whose claims were questionable, frivolous, or
fraudulent.
These problems, while real, are also manageable. Indeed,
judges in MDL cases have already devised workable procedures to
address the problem of inventory cases with low litigation or
settlement value. In the welding fumes cases, for example, the MDL
judge developed a simple mechanism for identifying and excluding
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (stating that present and future claims must be
divided into subclasses with separate representation to prevent conflicting interests of counsel);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (stating the need for individuals whose
sole duty is to represent members of that subgroup, not the entire class); Hansberry v. Lee, 331
U.S. 32, 44 (1940) (finding that parties who challenged an agreement were adequately
represented when the agreement was formed). Adequate representation is equally important in
MDLs. See PROJECT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF AGGREGATE LITIG. (2003-present),
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj-ip&projectid=7.
170. For example, a judge could appoint a group of lawyers to a PMC subject to the condition
that they join forces with another attorney whose inventory contains claimants with identified
injuries.
171. See Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for
Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1232-35 (2008) (describing procedures used by lawyers to
accumulate massive inventories of asbestos cases).
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weak cases. 172 Judge Kathleen O'Malley entered a case management
order requiring each plaintiff to provide a Notice of Diagnosis
certifying that a licensed medical doctor had examined the plaintiff
and diagnosed a manganese-induced neurological disorder. 173 This led
to the dismissal of about 25 percent of the pending claims.174 If "piling
on" is a problem at the outset of MDLs, it should often be possible to
use a procedure like Judge O'Malley's to exclude many weak claims.175
Even with appropriate screening mechanisms, however,
differences in client quality are likely to remain. But courts can deal
with this type of distinction. An analogous problem arises in class
actions brought under the PSLRA. Although the statute requires the
court to determine which person competing for the role of lead plaintiff
has "the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class," it
does not provide a formula for making this assessment.176 Nor is the
right way of proceeding necessarily self-evident. One applicant may
have suffered the largest absolute loss (measured in terms of dollars
paid out and received when securities were bought and sold), but
another may claim to have lost the most money during the period
when the fraud is thought to have occurred. A good deal of litigation
would be required to resolve close calls in PSLRA cases with a high
degree of certainty. Instead of calculating the size of an applicant's
financial interest in a rigorous and demanding way, judges have
developed a rough and ready multi-factor approach that relies on
certain basic information. 77 Once the pool is narrowed to a group of
172. This paragraph is adapted from Brickman, id. at 1294-97. See also Ralph A. Davies, A
Balanced Perspective: The Welding Fume Litigation, FOR DEF., Aug. 2007, at 14, 17,
http://forthedefense.org/CD/Public/FTD/2007/August/2007%2OAugust%2FTD%20-%20Welding
%20Fume%2OLitigation.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (discussing Judge O'Malley's method for
weeding out weak cases).
173. Brickman, supra note 171, at 1303 (citing In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 1535, Case No. 1:03-CV-17000, at 6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2006) (case administration order)).
174. Brickman, supra note 171, at 1294 (citing In re Welding Fumes Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 1535, Case No. 1:03-CV-17000 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2005) (report of proceedings of jury trail)).
175. Plaintiffs can also "pile on" after settlement. The settlement of the Diet Drugs litigation
provides an example. Although medical evidence led the defendant to predict about 36,000
claims, over 87,000 were submitted. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine,
Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 505, 508 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Back-end piling
on, however, while a significant problem for the administration of MDL cases, would not affect
our proposal for the selection of PMC members, which we anticipate will be done at the
beginning of the case.
176. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 440 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ('The PSLRA does
not delineate a procedure for determining the 'largest financial interest' among the proposed
class members.").
177. Id. ("The four factors relevant to the calculation are (1) the number of shares purchased;
(2) the number of net shares purchased; (3) the total net funds expended by the plaintiffs during
the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered by the plaintiffs.").
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applicants with similar financial stakes, a court might as well require
them to draw straws. All can be expected to do the job well.
Under our proposal, judges should evaluate lawyers' client
inventories the same way. The object is to put MDLs under the
stewardship of lawyers who will take seriously the task of providing
CBW because they have a lot of money at stake. Success in this
endeavor does not depend on quantifying a lawyer's financial interest
to the nearest thousand dollars, or even to the nearest ten thousand
dollars. It is probably more important to develop clear valuation rules
than highly accurate ones so as to avoid pointless litigation. Thus, the
court would make a preliminary inquiry into the value, as well as the
number, of claims. Applicants for a position on the PMC would have to
make a showing to the court, documenting the number of clients they
represent and arraying the clients by injury groups. However, the
court would not need to conduct a "mini-trial" on this question; it
usually should be sufficient to derive an ordinal ranking of the value
of applicants' inventory. If subsequent events demonstrate that an
applicant has distorted or exaggerated the value of his or her
inventory, the court has ample authority to impose sanctions, which
could include exclusion from the PMC or monetary penalties such as
forfeiture of fees earned as a PMC member.
As mentioned, PMC members would normally work without
additional compensation, meaning they would receive only the fees
their signed clients agreed to pay, minus a proportionate share of the
cost of CBW. This arrangement could be altered by agreement.
Lawyers not on the PMC who thought it advantageous to offer
supplements would be free to do so. For example, all lawyers might
agree to reimburse the costs PMC members incur when handling
administrative functions, such as the functions liaison counsel
normally performs. These tasks include distributing notices, orders,
filings, and other documents. Web-based services like LexisNexis have
made it easy to perform these ministerial functions. Limited lawyers
might often agree to reimburse PMC members for the actual out-of-
pocket costs, the alternative being to reimburse the CBC and possibly
to pay more for CBW. Limited lawyers might also reimburse PMC
members for expenses incurred when negotiating global settlements or
performing other services.
Although the PMC's presumptive fee award would be zero
dollars, the trial court would retain discretion to order a payment (but
would use the power sparingly). The primary role of PMC lawyers is to
provide general oversight and input on strategy. One might think of
them as an MDL board of directors, the members of which are paid
solely in options or shares. PMC lawyers will not ordinarily attend
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depositions, immerse themselves in discovered documents, or write
briefs. They will be litigation leaders and will enjoy the reputation,
prestige, and publicity incident to that role. When combined with the
fees received from their signed clients, these non-pecuniary benefits
should ordinarily eliminate the need for separate compensation.
Ideally, the trial court will decide whether and how much
supplemental compensation the PMC will receive before its members
are appointed. The court could, for example, make known its intention
to set aside a small percentage of any ultimate settlement or
judgment-say half of 1 percent-as compensation for the PMC
attorneys in the event the case results in a recovery for plaintiffs
within the MDL framework. With fees set so low, the danger
associated with judicial errors would be relatively slight. Such a
percentage fee would have the same desirable qualities of any
percentage fee in terms of aligning the interests of attorneys and those
they serve and also reducing the need for burdensome auditing of
hours claimed on a lodestar basis. Advance notice would additionally
enable all lawyers with cases in an MDL to offer their services and to
volunteer to accept less compensation. Willingness to accept a smaller
transfer might then provide a basis for choosing between lawyers with
similar client inventories.
How would the CBC be compensated? In our proposal, the PMC
would negotiate a retainer agreement with the CBC-similar to a
retainer agreement for ordinary litigation. Presumably the CBC would
be given a contingent fee, but issues such as the percentage, the use
(or not) of a (rising or falling) sliding scale of percentages, adjustments
tied to events in the litigation (such as motions to dismiss, summary
judgments, or appeals), and the allocation of responsibility for the
payment of costs and expenses, would all be left to private bargaining.
Judicial review would be available only to police fraud or other
abuses.178
One compensation question is unique to the MDL context,
however. Not all MDLs resolve all pending cases-indeed, the MDL
process is not intended for the final resolution of controversies, being
instead (at least in theory) a pretrial procedure. A few MDLs have, in
178. When commenting on drafts of this article, several readers identified reciprocal
agreements between the PMC and the CBC as a potential source of corruption. The PMC in Case
1 would hire a particular CBC at a high wage with the understanding that the CBC would
return the favor in Case 2, where the CBC would attempt to become PMC. To discourage such
arrangements, judges could require lawyers chosen as PMC or CBC to disclose prior
appointments to these roles and to disavow any side deals. Judges could also impose prophylactic
rules limiting the frequency with which lawyers can swap positions.
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fact, ended when pretrial preparations were complete, at which point
active cases were returned to the forums from which they came.
If the possibility of remand is to be more than a mirage,
however, a plan must be in place for taxing cases returned to
transferor courts. This issue arises under existing procedures as well
as under our proposal, but may be more successfully managed under
the latter. For one thing, our proposal may facilitate consensual
arrangements to govern fee sharing in remanded cases. For another,
when bargaining with the CBC, the PMC could establish scales in
which the CBC's fees would depend on how remanded cases fared. For
example, the CBC might receive a higher fee on cases that settled soon
after remand and a lower fee on remanded cases that were resolved
after trials. Arrangements like these would reflect the value of the
CBC's efforts and preserve lawyers' incentives to prosecute cases
zealously after remand.
Having described the proposal in detail, we reemphasize its
status as a default rule which can be supplanted by agreement of the
PMC and other attorneys with cases in an MDL. To appreciate the
value of the default rule approach, it helps to conceptualize the
plaintiffs' side of an MDL as a group of investors (lawyers
representing clients with valuable claims) who pool their assets to
pursue a common goal (the maximization of claim values and, thereby,
contingent fees). The investors place their assets under the control of a
common group of agents or managers, who receive compensation for
working for the common good. Collectively, the investors and
managers operate as a firm.
Under the quasi-class action approach to MDL management,
the governance structure for the firm is determined in an odd way.
The investors hand over all control rights to a government official-a
judge, who has, at best, no interest in the performance of the firm or,
at worst, interests at odds with those of the investors. The judge
cannot be replaced, cannot be incentivized monetarily to want the best
outcome for the investors, and suffers none of the constraints that
normally apply in labor markets, such as the requirement of
possessing or demonstrating the knowledge, skill, and trustworthiness
needed to convince investors to hand over assets. The judge may also
reshuffle the investors' interests in the firm at any time, meaning that
ex ante contributions may not reliably predict ex post payouts. The
manner of designing a governance structure embodied in the quasi-
class action approach to MDL management has no analogue in the
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capitalist world, 179 and for good reason: investors do not use it because
it cannot reasonably be expected to produce optimal governance for
any firm. Our default proposal improves on the quasi-class action
approach by putting governance in the hands of a controlling investor
(or a group of cooperating investors) with a large stake in the outcome
of litigation.
Although our proposal is a step in the right direction, for two
reasons it may be improved by allowing attorneys with cases in an
MDL the option of designing a governance structure they prefer. First,
MDLs differ in ways that seem likely to bear on the design of optimal
governance structures. For example, some MDLs involve far more
claimants or attorneys than others. If the severity of monitoring
problems correlates with the number of participants, different
governance structures may be needed in the two contexts. As one
governance structure may not work best in all MDLs, it is reasonable
to give attorneys freedom to design structures that are custom-made
for particular consolidations.
Second, placing complete control of an MDL in the hands of a
PMC may create unforeseen opportunities for the PMC to exploit
other investors. Exploitation is a recognized problem in real firms run
by majority stakeholders. For this reason, the law governing
corporations and other business ventures safeguards minority
investors' interests in a variety of ways. Of particular importance are
common law duties that require majority stakeholders to treat
minority owners fairly. Lawyers in an MDL might find it
advantageous to borrow these protections by forming corporations,
limited partnerships, or other organizations where the duties of
investor-managers are well known. For example, by providing
contractually for the application of Delaware law and the arbitration
of disputes, a group of investor-attorneys might avoid a good deal of
uncertainty about the PMC's rights and responsibilities.
The observation that MDL lawyers might find it attractive to
use established business forms raises several questions. One is
whether state bar rules or other laws would force lawyers to use
forms, such as partnerships or limited liability partnerships,
recognized as permissible vehicles for the delivery of legal services to
the public. We would not impose this constraint. As long as lawyers
practice in firms that are approved structures, we see no reason to
179. When calling for greater judicial oversight of fees in mass tort cases, Professor Resnik
identified some of the many difficulties of setting fees correctly. Resnik, supra note 6, at 2177-80.
Yet, she offered few reasons for believing that judges would regulate lawyers' compensation well.
In a prior article, Professor Resnik also acknowledged that serious conflicts and information
problems hamper judicial regulation of fees. Curtis & Resnik, supra note 46, at 452-53.
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limit the range of options they can use to organize the delivery of CBW
in an MDL. Another question is whether transactions costs or other
impediments will prevent lawyers from designing optimal structures
or possibly from organizing spontaneously at all. The answer is sure to
be "yes" on some occasions, but this shows only that the proposal is
imperfect, not that the quasi-class action approach is better. A final
question is whether voting rules other than unanimity may suffice to
displace the default rule. In other words, might the default rule be
displaced by a coalition containing fewer than all lawyers with cases
in an MDL? As structured, the proposal does not require unanimity.
We would allow the court to establish decision-rules for determining
whether the default organization proposed in this paper will be
displaced by some other structure. We predict that, once the proposal
is in place, informal norms governing the formation of coalitions will
arise, and bargaining over control will become more structured.
B. The Proposal's Advantages
The proposed mechanism has attractive features: it provides a
superior mechanism for selecting, monitoring, and compensating
counsel; it safeguards judicial independence; and it tends to achieve
fairness and reduce distrust and animosity among plaintiffs'
counsel.180
1. Selection of Counsel
The proposal involves two selection stages: (a) selection of the
PMC by the court, and (b) selection of the CBC by the PMC. In both
stages, our proposal offers advantages over the current system. Judges
will be limited to selecting PMC members under explicit standards
and on the basis of written applications. The unreviewable discretion
and lack of transparency that characterize the current practice will be
replaced by objectivity, clarity, and sensible selection criteria. This
will alleviate the existing concern that judges appoint CBC for
inappropriate reasons.
PMCs, in turn, will be well-positioned to select the CBCs.
Having valuable client inventories from which they hope to receive
180. Some MDLs contain class actions. We have not tailored the proposal for use in these
proceedings. One possibility would be to award fees separately for class counsel and the CBC, as
was done in Diet Drugs. 226 F.R.D. at 504. This might be workable if the tasks to be performed
by class counsel and the CBC were divided upfront, for the PMC could then negotiate with the
CBC knowing which tasks the CBC would perform. This seems both awkward and artificial,
however. Class counsel and the CBC have the same job: providing CBW.
2010]1 169
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
substantial contingent fees, PMC attorneys will have much to gain
from the effective provision of CBW. In this respect, their incentives
will align strongly with those of all plaintiffs. 81 PMC members will
also have excellent information on which to select the CBC. They will
often have worked with candidates for the CBC position and
thoroughly appreciate their backgrounds and capacities. Unlike
judges, who observe work product of teams of attorneys, members of
the PMC will often have observed the work product of individual
attorneys. They will know, much more than judges, details about
interpersonal relationships, personality characteristics, and work
habits-issues that can play an important role in the practical conduct
of litigation. PMC members will also be better equipped than judges to
negotiate retainer agreements with candidates for the CBC position
and to ensure that those agreements contain appropriate safeguards
for the protection of the plaintiffs as a group.
Finally, PMC lawyers who know little about other attorneys
initially will always have incentives to learn which lawyers are best at
particular tasks. By finding lawyers who are good at taking discovery
and performing other pretrial tasks, they will increase the value of
their clients' claims and increase their fees. Judges have no analogous
incentive.
2. Compensation of Counsel
Judges are also less suited to setting and allocating fees for
CBW. Judges gain nothing when CBC's fees are low, lose nothing
when CBC's fees are high, and have no direct financial stake in the
quality of CBW. Self-interest thus provides judges no incentive to
ensure that the CBW fees are reasonable. Moreover, the evidence
suggests that judges have not, in fact, done a particularly scientific job
at setting fees. As shown in Part II, common benefit fees appear to
have been set on a largely ad hoc basis, possibly according to
considerations such as the politics of the plaintiffs' group or the
judge's prediction of the level of dissatisfaction a particular fee will
create among the limited attorneys. Sometimes judges appear to
181. An example will make the PMC's incentives clear. Suppose that all claimants in an
MDL are identical, that the PMC represents half of them pursuant to 40 percent contingent fee
agreements, and that PMC can hire Lawyer A or Lawyer B as CBC. Both lawyers want the same
fee, 5 percent of the gross recovery, but A is the better pick and will generate an expected
recovery 10 percent larger than B ($110M vs $100M). If A is hired, the PMC's fee will be
($110M)(.5)(.4) - ($110M)(.05)(.5) = $19.275M. If B is hired, the PMC will earn less-
($100M)(.5)(.4) - ($100M)(.05)(.5) = $17.5M. By hiring the inferior lawyer, the PMC would harm
itself. This will be true as long as the PMC promises the CBC less than its entire contingent fee.
Obviously, the PMC also does better by bargaining down A's fee.
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award particularly generous fees without reference to market prices;
at other times they extract concessions with a bludgeon, as Judge
Frank did in Guidant by setting lead attorneys' hourly rates below
market levels. 182 Judges have no particular background or expertise in
negotiating fee agreements with counsel; this is not part of their
judicial function, and memories of having performed this role in
practice may be distant and unhelpful.
Our proposal will permit the use of innovative combinations of
incentives and monitoring to encourage the production of high-quality
CBW at the lowest possible expense. This flexibility is important
because every MDL is different. Vioxx involved more than five times
as many claimants as Zyprexa and more than ten times as many
claimants as Guidant. Only Zyprexa claimants had serious
psychological disabilities. Guidant claimants, all of whom had
implanted defibrillators, were in much poorer health prior to use of
the product than Vioxx claimants. Guidant also involved a medical
device, not a drug. These and countless others differences could affect
the way MDLs should be funded and developed. Experienced lawyers
know what to make of these things, but judges likely do not. Judges go
from one MDL to another calculating CBW the same way-that is, at
hourly rates for amounts of time lead attorneys deem reasonable. The
reason for preferring this "one-size-fits-all" approach is not apparent.
PMC members could also use non-monetary incentives to their
advantage. Serving as CBC in a high-profile products liability MDL is
a plum assignment. Lead attorneys gain prestige, enhance their
ability to obtain clients and referrals, develop valuable skills, and so
on. Recognizing the desirable nature of the CBC assignment, PMCs
could use non-monetary benefits to obtain CBCs who offer a superior
combination of quality and price. PMCs could also use competition
among attorneys to maximize this advantage. For example, innovative
judges have carried out auctions of the lead counsel role in class action
cases. 183 Although this strategy has been criticized, especially for
182. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708,
2008 WL 682174, at *15 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (capping lead lawyers' rates at $400 per hour
and paralegals' rates at $150 per hour, when the highest submitted charges were $745 and $290,
respectively).
183. See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 470-73 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(comparing three firms competing to be class counsel); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538,
542-47 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (analyzing three bids for lead counsel). For general discussion of
auctions as means for addressing agency costs in class action cases, see Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1991).
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securities fraud cases,184 it appears in some cases to have significantly
reduced fees without sacrificing quality. 85 Members of a PMC could
experiment with an auction approach for selecting CBCs. They might
also require a CBC to "buy into" an MDL. Mass tort litigation often
requires attorneys to bear significant costs upfront. The members of a
PMC may believe that a CBC can be properly incentivized only if he or
she has a share of the sunk costs.
The proposal also allows fees for CBW to exceed their historical
levels. Although we have pointed out factors that seem likely to cause
lead attorneys to be overpaid, in any given instance the presiding
judge may pay them too little. Judges often cut lead attorneys' fee
requests, reducing their hours or their hourly rates or disallowing
claimed services entirely. Presumably, lead attorneys know judges'
predilections and refrain from performing services for which judges
will not award sufficient compensation. When CBW is reasonably
expected to increase claimants' recoveries on net, judges do not help
claimants by being overly parsimonious.
3. Monitoring
Judges are at a disadvantage when it comes to monitoring the
performance of CBW in MDLs. Judges are busy individuals with many
cases on their dockets. Their exposure to any single proceeding, even
one as complex and interesting as a products liability MDL, tends to
be episodic. They are not equipped, nor do they wish, to audit the
quotidian work of CBC. Even if they could observe this work-and
generally they cannot-they are poorly equipped to determine
whether work is being performed in a cost-effective manner. Our
proposal would improve monitoring of CBW by placing this task in the
PMC, expert attorneys with high expectations, immediate access to
184. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d. 201, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting auction
approach in private securities litigation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Using
Auctions to Select Lead Counsel, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889, 891-99 (2002) (criticizing the use of
auctions for selecting class counsel); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the
Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 695-702 (2002) (arguing that
optimality of auctions depends on key assumptions that are not met when selecting class
counsel). But see Geoffrey Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 633, 643-50 (2003) (advocating ex post auctions for lead counsel rights at the time of
settlement).
185. See Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors: The Impact of Competition and
Experience on Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions 23 (St. John's Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 06-0034, 2006) (finding that fees in securities class actions tend to be lower when lead




work product, and strong incentives to see that the work is done well.
The PMC members will lose the most if the CBC performs poorly or
overcharges.
Members of the PMC would have excellent sources of
information with which to perform these monitoring tasks. Unlike the
institutional investors who are frequently chosen as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions, the members of the PMC will all be attorneys.
Their training and professional experience qualify them to monitor the
work product of those who are chosen to carry out the CBW. PMC
members are, moreover, attorneys for clients with cases in the
litigation, and thus can be presumed to have case-specific knowledge
and expertise. Because they will presumptively be the attorneys with
the most valuable client inventories, they have multiple exposures to
the key issues in the litigation. With many clients, they have the
opportunity to observe general themes or features of the litigation that
might not be apparent to an attorney with a small number of clients.
Accordingly, they would be expected to be excellent monitors of the
CBC attorneys.
4. Preserving Judicial Independence
Existing practices compromise judicial independence by placing
judges in uncomfortably tight relationships with members of the
PSC.186 The current regime of unfettered judicial discretion naturally
sparks concerns, whether or not justified, that judges are too closely
associated with the attorneys they appoint to leadership roles. The
concern goes both ways: some may worry that the lead attorneys may
be too influential with the judge, while others may consider that the
judge's enormous power over the selection and compensation of
counsel makes the lawyers occupying the leadership posts too
subservient to the judicial will.
Our proposal addresses both concerns. It adds transparency by
substituting objective standards for the current discretionary regime.
If and when judges pass over attorneys with large and valuable client
inventories, they will have to state reasons for putting lawyers with
few or no clients in charge. This will alleviate the appearance of
favoritism. The recommended procedures for compensating CBCs
provide even greater assurance of independence. Judges would no
longer be in the position of awarding hundreds of millions of dollars
for CBW, on the basis of little analysis and no objective justification.
186. For a discussion of how existing practices compromise judges' independence, see supra
text accompanying notes 126-129.
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The fees for the PMC attorneys would be either zero or a small
percentage of the MDL recovery. Meanwhile, fees for the CBC would
be established, not by the judge, but by the PMC members. No adverse
inferences about judicial independence could be drawn from this
process.
5. Improving Fairness and Trust among Plaintiffs' Attorneys
We have also seen that existing practice tends to foment
distrust, anger, and dissention among plaintiffs' attorneys. Some
attorneys are richly rewarded for serving in leadership roles or
performing common benefit work; others see their expected profits
from privately negotiated fee agreements evaporate as judges tax
them for common benefit work done by others. Attorneys who
assemble large inventories by advertising for clients tend to be
denigrated as crass mercenaries whose only role is to free-ride on the
efforts of others-an attitude that resonates with long-standing
suspicion of advertising and marketing of legal services.187
The quasi-class action approach gives control of MDLs to
lawyers skilled at managing lawsuits and providing CBW. It also
rewards these lawyers lavishly, while capping other lawyers' fees at
sub-market rates. The quasi-class action model thus punishes
plaintiffs' attorneys whose main contribution is "rainmaking" and
devalues the service of reaching potential clients and getting them to
assert claims. In placing lawyers "who do the work" above lawyers
"who troll for clients," the quasi-class action approach reflects the
(unwarranted) disdain many judges, lawyers, bar associations,
politicians, and others have for lawyers who advertise. This Article
does not debate the merits of attorneys' efforts to market legal
services,188 but it is appropriate to note, first, that judges may
discourage lawyers from reaching out to potential clients by reducing
compensating for this service, and, second, that judges have no special
insights into the amount of marketing that is good for society or the
reputation of the legal profession.
This proposal will award control of the PMC on the basis of
inventory value. It follows that judges will (and should) give control to
187. This tendency is reflected in many policies regulating lawyers, including restrictions on
advertising and referral fees.
188. Opponents of lawyer advertising contend that it damages the profession's reputation.
Empirical studies have not borne this out. Richard J. Cebula, Does Lawyer Advertising Adversely
Influence the Image of Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative Perspective and New
Empirical Evidence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 514 (1998); Richard J. Cebula, Historical and




attorneys who advertise for clients some percentage of the time.
Advertising should not disqualify a lawyer from serving on the PMC.
Attorneys with valuable inventories of cases have the most to gain-
and the most to lose-from the activities of the CBC. It is, accordingly,
appropriate that they be given a leadership role in the selection,
compensation, and monitoring of these attorneys. An advertising
attorney who is incapable or unwilling to do the job properly will gain
financially by joining forces with superior case managers. The
possibility that incompetent lawyers will exercise control is not an
equilibrium result.
The proposal may also enhance relationships among lawyers by
encouraging the formation of large cooperating groups. As explained,
the proposal will award control of an MDL to the lawyer or lawyer-
group with the most valuable client inventory. If control is valuable or
if lawyers prefer to be part of control groups for other reasons,
incentives will exist for lawyers to improve their odds of winning
competitions by teaming up with others. At the limit, a grand coalition
of all lawyers with cases in an MDL would arise. Such a coalition
would regulate all lawyers' responsibilities for common benefit fees
and expenses contractually, eliminating the need for coerced fee
sharing. Even if grand coalitions are unlikely, it is plausible that
coalitions representing more than half the claimants would form.
Coalitions of this size, which would meet the "minimum winning"
threshold identified by game theorists, would reduce the need for
forced transfers, even if they would not eliminate it.189
Although our proposal has yet to be applied in any MDL,
judges have sometimes left the task of organizing the production of
CBW in consolidations to attorneys, with good results. The famous
MER/29 litigation is one example.190 The litigation against Tenet
Healthcare stemming from unnecessary heart surgeries at its
Redding, California hospital is another. Although the investigation
into Tenet's practices and the resulting litigation received extensive
coverage in the media, 19' the story of the cooperation among plaintiffs'
lawyers is less well-known.192
189. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 32 (1962).
190. See Rheingold, supra note 67, at 123-24 (1968) (describing the operation of the
plaintiffs' lawyers).
191. See, e.g., Christian Berthelsen & Victoria Colliver, Tenet Settles Surgery Probes:
Hospital Giant Agrees to Pay $54 Million, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2003, at B1 (Tenet settling
federal investigation); Reuters, $395 Million Payment to Settle Unnecessary-Surgeries Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at C10 (Tenet settling private claims).
192. The details that follow were provided in two memoranda by Richard Frankel, an
attorney involved in the litigation. We are grateful for the information Mr. Frankel provided and
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In the Tenet Healthcare litigation, over seven hundred
plaintiffs filed lawsuits in a California state court. Three California
law firms represented about 90 percent of them. The remaining
plaintiffs were divided among several firms, each of which had a small
number of clients. In what might seem a surprising move, two of the
California firms with large client groups paired up with two Texas
firms to develop the litigation. The Texas lawyers, who formerly
served as co-counsel with one of the California firms, had previously
scored a large success in litigation against Tenet. Working together,
the California and Texas lawyers survived Tenet's efforts to get the
cases dismissed and secured a $395 million settlement. No fee
transfers occurred-the lawyers collected fees only from their signed
clients. The firms shared common expenses by agreement. The law
firms with few clients enjoyed the lead lawyers' work product without
charge, but the lead lawyers were happy to share. They gained by
having almost complete freedom to manage the litigation as they
wished.
V. CONCLUSION
MDLs are an important feature of the American litigation
landscape. Unfortunately, the control structures that govern these
massive proceedings are poorly designed. With good intentions, judges
have taken to characterizing these cases as "quasi-class actions" and
have used the authority the label confers to exercise unfettered control
over the selection and compensation of lead attorneys. Existing
practices lead to the selection and compensation of counsel on the
basis of opaque and arbitrary criteria; threaten judicial independence;
draw unfair and unreasonable distinctions among groups of counsel on
the plaintiffs' side; and permit the arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable exercise of judicial power.
This Article proposes a simple, workable, and effective
alternative to the existing system. It recommends implementation of a
default mechanism, inspired by the PSLRA, that would place MDLs
under the control of management committees composed of attorneys
with valuable client inventories. These attorneys would possess the
right incentives and expertise to properly manage the common benefit
work. The management committee would then select, retain, and
monitor other attorneys who perform the common benefit work under
privately negotiated fee agreements. The court would stand back from
for his views on the economics of mass tort representations and cooperation among groups of
attorneys.
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the process, exercising only a limited authority to prevent potential
abuse. This system would foster fairer, more efficient, and more
appropriate management of complex MDLs in American courts.
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